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ANGOLA

Further Reports on UNITA Accusation of 'Toxic Bomb' Use

Correction to Earlier Report

MB2304123089

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "UNITA Claims Government Use of 'Toxic Bomb' on 20 Apr" published in the JPRS Report ARMS CONTROL for 26 April 1989, JPRS-TAC-89-017, page 1:

Paragraph one, sentence two: ...April says between 1300 and 1500 GMT on... (correcting GMT time)

Effects of Bombing

MB2704164089 (*Clandestine Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0500 GMT 27 Apr 89*)

[Excerpt] Many victims of the toxic gases have died, including three children, after the Luanda regime's tragic and terrible bombing of three regions in Bie Province on 20 April. Other victims are having trouble breathing, vomiting black substances, experiencing severe headaches, and falling unconscious.

FAPLA 48th Brigade troops continued the offensive undertaken by the MPLA leaders in Bie Province by looting the people's property and then spraying another toxic gas, which induces symptoms of madness in those affected in the village of (Caminguli) in the (Capulo) area. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Chemical Warfare

MB2704160989 (*Clandestine Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0500 GMT 27 Apr 89*)

[Commentary: "The MPLA Leaders' Policy of Trying to Please Does not Hide Their Crimes"—read by Clarindo Caputo]

[Text] We have recently seen evidence that the MPLA Labor Party-leaders are involved in a campaign of charm [preceding word in English]. It is a campaign of trying to please various African countries, both neighbors and non-neighbors and even other countries outside the continent. Millions of dollars are spent on banquets, while some dirty streets have not been cleaned since 1976. The only thing that does not end, and will not end with a tyrannical regime in Luanda, is the misery of the Angola people, the insecurity, the tyranny, the intransigence, and the servility. Even so, the forced smiles of the MPLA Labor Party leaders do not hide their true intentions. They are dubious, and even better, are against genuine national reconciliation. They categorically favor the genocide of the Angolan people.

Long before the worst happened, we had been alerting public opinion and many persons who were supposedly defending liberty and human rights. They were really at the service of Soviet-Cuban imperialism, and preferred to continue the campaign to denigrate UNITA, something that only served to support the MPLA leaders' genocide venture.

This is the situation now: Airplanes piloted by Cubans and other foreign mercenaries launched highly toxic bombs in the Chaminga and Quati regions of Cuando Cubango Province, and in a densely populated village, Chicundo and Umpulo, in Bie Province, killing men, women, and children and causing physical disorders such as dyspnea, vomiting, unconsciousness, and chest pains. To avoid any doubts, the places bombarded in Cuando Cubango Province have already been visited by specialist international observers from Europe, who were able to photograph, film, and take necessary samples for laboratory analyses in world renowned institutions.

The results are alarming. Various scientific specialists and military people think these products are not yet known and are being used for the first time in Angola. Who is responsible for supplying those toxic products? Those are the questions men and women genuinely engaged in the defense of liberty, and in the defense of universal democracy, ask in order to find out the truth.

Even though the Soviet-Cuban imperialism has tried to deceive the Angolan vigilance, we can say that the bombs carry specific marks of their stock batch as well as their origin. They come from the Warsaw Pact bloc. The Soviets, the Cubans, and the Bulgarians know that we are telling the truth. Unless the Soviet-Cuban imperialism will now try to excuse itself so shamefully, saying the MPLA Labor Party-leaders stole the bombs from the Soviet, Cuban, and Bulgarian stocks and that the airplanes used and piloted by foreigners—the Mig-23's—were stolen, which would be ridiculous, befitting an information gangsterism [preceding word in English].

Angolans are being bombarded by toxic weapons. Men and women are dying. The international community must take a stand against the genocide of the Angolan people by the MPLA Labor Party-leaders and their bosses. The conservative Republican senators have already questioned James Baker, the new U.S. administration's secretary of state, on the probable use of chemical weapons in southern Angola during the 18 January 1989 meeting of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

According to those same senators, the chemical weapons had already been used by the Cuban forces in southern Angola, and there were tons of chemical weapons stored in Angola coming from the USSR. Mr James Baker affirmed he had no knowledge of such assertions, but promised to investigate. This is the correct stand, because he left a door of inquiry open. Now we, the martyred Angolan people, are providing concrete data: the localities where the bombing

took place, and the fact that seriously wounded people are arriving at our hospitals for immediate assistance.

We knew the MPLA leaders were such liars—this is the term—because at the international conference held in Paris on the use of chemical weapons, they peremptorily denied having used chemical weapons on Angolan territory. Even Luis de Almeida, their representative in Paris at the time, abusively tried to deny the competence of Professor (Hendrick) from (Granz) University in Belgium, who had made a detailed study on the matter in the territories liberated by UNITA.

The international community should take a stand, firmly condemning such criminal acts practiced against the noble Angolan people. Angolan people, the MPLA-Labor Party leaders no longer have arguments nor military or moral strength to oppose the will of a people, who want freedom, democracy, and social justice. The use of chemical weapons is proof of its weakness, debility, and servility. Angola will be free, truly independent, and democratic. The assassins, the MPLA-Labor Party leaders, will be conquered by the Angolan people. Long live liberty. Long live the true independence of Angola.

Commentary on Bush's Strategic Arms Modernization Plans

HK2604122289 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
26 Apr 89 p 3

["Commentary" by staff reporter Zhāng Qixin: "The Bush Administration's Decision"]

[Text] Washington, 25 Apr (RENMIN RIBAO)—After a few days of discussion, the Bush administration has just drawn up a strategic arms modernization scheme. On 23 April U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney announced on television that President Bush had decided to simultaneously develop two types of mobile land-based intercontinental missiles. According to this scheme, the United States will remove the existing 50 MX missiles from their launching silos and put them up on train cars; at the same time, the United States will continue to develop a type of Midgetman missiles that can be carried by heavy-duty trucks.

Although the review of the strategy as a whole has still not been completed, the Bush administration has made a first decision on the development of strategic arms. This is apparently closely related to the forthcoming congressional debate on military expenses. A rough analysis of this decision shows that it is a result of the compromise between two different views within the United States on the issue of land-based missiles achieved by President Bush after an evaluation of some practical factors, and that it is somewhat different from the policy of the Reagan era.

The first concern is the relationship between the reduction of budgetary deficits and the modernization of strategic weapons. As far as the modernization of strategic weapons is concerned, the focus of controversy has always been on the way to increase the mobility and covertness of land-based intercontinental missiles with a view to raising the probability of survival in case of nuclear strike. In the past 10 years or more, the different parties involved in the controversy have compared dozens of schemes, and they have now generally agreed to choose the MX and Midgetman missiles. But these two types of missiles have their own advantages and disadvantages, and the debate has not been ended. The new situation arising since Bush assumed office has forced the administration to reconsider the issue. Not long ago, the government and Congress reached an agreement on the reduction of the huge budgetary deficits which incorporates a program on further reduction of military expenses. As less military appropriation is available now as compared with the Reagan era, the distribution of military expenditure and the amount of funds to be spent on strategic weapons and strategic defense have become the focus of the debate.

This has been a knotty problem for Cheney since his appointment as secretary of defense. He suggested that fewer funds be used to raise the mobility of the MX missiles. As estimated by the Pentagon, the reinstallation

of all the 50 MX missiles on train cars could be completed by 1992 with \$5.4 billion. In view of the limited budget, Cheney also suggested that the overexpensive plan to develop Midgetman missiles be given up (as it is estimated that it would cost \$25 billion to manufacture 500 Midgetman missiles with a single warhead). But Cheney's idea has been criticized by the Democrat-dominated Congress, and the opinions vary within the government. Both the chairmen of the military committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate asserted that Cheney's proposal would not get an approval from Congress. So they have strongly recommended the Midgetman missile scheme believing that these kind of missiles have a higher degree of mobility than MX missiles. Thus it is quite clear that Bush, when deciding to develop both MX and Midgetman missiles, has taken both the need of increasing the mobility of intercontinental missiles and the attitude of Congress into consideration. It was revealed that the key task to be accomplished in the several years after 1990 will be to increase the mobility of MX missiles; at the same time, \$200-300 million will be appropriated each year to develop Midgetman missiles; and the deployment of these missiles will be considered afterward. But, anyway, how far this decision will be accepted by Congress still remains in doubt, and the possibility of further changes cannot be ruled out.

The modernization of land-based missiles also has a bearing on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks. In the Reagan era, since 1983 when the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] (that is, the Star Wars program) was put forth, the United States has put less stress on the mobility of missiles but placed the focus on the development of an antimissile defensive system with the aim of guaranteeing the safety of its intercontinental missiles. But the Star Wars program is too big a plan, and developments in the last few years have shown that many technical problems have to be resolved before it can be materialized. By the way, the possibility of success of this program remains a controversial issue in the United States. Furthermore, whether the SDI constitutes a breach of the anti-missile treaty has been a longstanding controversy in, and the biggest obstacle to, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks. Now even the Bush administration is considering the possibility of cutting the budget of the Star Wars program, reducing its scale, and shifting the focus to the development of another less expensive "Brilliant Cobblestones" [CAN LAM LUAN SHI 3503 3620 0607 4258] anti-missile system. It is against such a backdrop that the plan to realize the mobility of intercontinental missiles is placed on the important agenda again. Just to cite a figure to illustrate the current nuclear power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has already deployed its SS-24 and SS-25 mobile missiles, so the United States on its part cannot lag behind its rival. It is said that the Department of State has endorsed Bush's decision on developing both kinds of mobile missiles, believing that this plan will improve the United States' strategic position, increase its bargaining power in the nuclear talks, help to bring

about a consensus between the government and Congress, and thus ensure that Congress will readily ratify any new nuclear treaty that may be concluded in the future. Undoubtedly the United States' decision will have an influence on the future U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks.

Changes in U.S. 'Star Wars' Program Viewed
HK2804132289 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by staff reporter Zhang Liang: "New Version of Star Wars Program"]

[Text] Where will the "Star Wars program" go? This is one of the problems that the Bush administration has been pondering since it came into office. Minister of Defense Cheney recently confirmed that President Bush has decided to adopt a new idea known as "brilliant pebbles," which is different from the concept put forward by Reagan with respect to the "Star Wars" program. This means that the United States will put into space an anti-missile system comprising a large number of small, highly intelligent interceptive rockets, rather than build a large scale multi-layer defensive shield in space as originally planned. This seemingly indicates that the United States will continue to study its "Star Wars" program, but on a smaller scale.

The new "brilliant pebbles" concept means intercepting enemy nuclear guided missiles very accurately by means of between 10,000 and 100,000 "small, cheap, and highly intelligent" interceptive rockets. According to the tentative idea, the interceptive rocket is 3 feet long, weighs 100 pounds, flies at 4 miles per second, is equipped with a "brain" (silicon sheet), whose performance is similar to that of the super electronic computer,

and has eyes (wide-angle detectors). The rocket can follow the flame given off when a guided missile is fired and automatically trains in on its target without instructions from detection satellites or ground stations. Reagan's original plan was to intercept the enemy's guided missile step by step, that is, when the missile is fired, on the way, and before it reaches U.S. territory, using all kinds of weapons including high-energy lasers and particle-bunch weapons. These weapons feature "large volume, great weight, and high cost."

The "brilliant pebbles" concept was invented by two scientists in California. In the summer of last year, they persuaded Bush to accept this concept. It was also these two scientists who persuaded Reagan to set forth on the "Star Wars" program, announced in March 1983. It was reported that it will cost between \$500,000 and \$1,500,000 to manufacture an interceptive rocket, with the total expenditure being only 1/3 of that for the original program. If everything goes smoothly, the rockets will be deployed in 1994.

But this new idea has been called into question by quite a number of experts in the United States, who referred to it as a plan "which has not been fully studied and assessed, is immature, and fraught with defects." Again, the expenditure has been greatly underestimated. Some people have said that the Soviet Union is capable of building new guided missiles which can take off at such a great speed that they will have entered space before the flame is discovered by U.S. interceptive rockets. Some even warned that many interceptive rockets will lead to a "traffic jam" and "collision disasters" in space, and that the pollution caused by fragments and other chain reactions will be very harmful to astronauts and space shuttles.

BULGARIA

Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone Endorsed at Zhivkov-Papandreou Summit

Talks in Alexandroupolis, Greece

NC2204124089 Athens Domestic Service in Greek
1130 GMT 22 Apr 89

[Excerpts] The people of Alexandroupolis welcomed the Greek and Bulgarian leaders today in a friendly and cordial manner. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, started their talks immediately. [passage omitted]

Apart from bilateral issues, priority will also be given during the talks to inter-Balkan cooperation, the nuclear-free Balkans, and the matter of minorities. [passage omitted]

End First Day of Talks

NC2204192089 Athens Domestic Service in Greek
1800 GMT 22 Apr 89

[Excerpt] The future of inter-Balkan cooperation and other bilateral and international issues were discussed today, during the first day of the informal working meeting between Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov at Alexandroupolis.

Our correspondent Kiki Papa reports:

[Begin recording] Three important agreements are expected to be signed tomorrow at Khaskovo, Bulgaria during the meetings between Prime Minister Papandreou and President Zhivkov of Bulgaria; Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias and his Bulgarian counterpart Petur Mladenov; and Commerce Minister Ioannis Papandoniou and Bulgarian Foreign Economic Relations Minister Khristov.

These agreements will cover: first, prevention of nuclear accidents; second, creation of a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone in both countries; and third, a 10-year framework agreement for commercial and economic transactions between the two countries. [passage omitted]

CSCE Role in Balkans, Mediterranean

AU2404122189 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 23 Apr 89 pp 1, 5

["Speech by Comrade Todor Zhivkov," general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and chairman of the State Council, at 22 April official luncheon in Alexandroupolis given in his honor by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Mr Prime Minister,

Esteemed friends, I am happy to have had the opportunity to visit this beautiful part of Greece, greet the citizens of Alexandroupolis, and convey to the Greek people the Bulgarian people's feelings of sincere respect and friendship. The warmth and hospitality with which you have greeted us on Greek soil convincingly show that these feelings are mutual. [passage omitted]

Esteemed friends, in recent years we have been witnessing a crucial turning point in the world development. Many of the artificially created barriers placed in front of the peoples' striving to live in peace and understanding, which have existed for decades, are being dismantled.

Some of the past stereotypes are also being eliminated.

—International tension is abating, and the USSR-U.S. INF Treaty is being implemented.

—A change in the approaches toward solving regional conflict, mainly through the use of political means, is emerging.

At the threshold of the third millennium we appear to clearly understand that for our diversified, contradictory, but mutually dependent world there is no other road than the road of common creativity and development.

Simultaneously, the dynamics of the positive changes still do not correspond to the requirements of our time.

—The nuclear threat continues to exist.

—The sources of many regional conflicts continue to exist.

—There is a real danger of the ecological balance being violated, something that could have unforeseeable consequences.

Consequently, we must persist in our efforts to strengthen peace and international security and solve global international issues in the interest of entire mankind. It is high time to understand throughout the world the priority of the universal values and adopt uniform measures for protecting human civilization.

We are happy to note that the positions of neighboring Greece on the main international issues coincide with, or are similar to our positions.

Naturally, the People's Republic of Bulgaria gives the Balkans priority in its international relations. We are decisively interested in turning relations in the Balkan Peninsula into a firm and constructive element of stability throughout Europe.

In this context I would like to express again our views on certain problems that at first glance seem peripheral to us. I mean the problems of the Mediterranean and Cyprus.

Formally, Bulgaria is not a Mediterranean state. However, it is situated in such close proximity to the Mediterranean that it is vitally interested in this region being turned into a zone of stable peace, security, and cooperation.

- We adhere to the consistent and comprehensive implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements, which refer to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.
- We deem it necessary that the measures on strengthening confidence and security that have been coordinated in Stockholm also encompass this region. [passage omitted]

Khaskovo, Bulgaria Meeting

*AU2504142189 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 24 Apr 89 pp 1, 2*

[Report by Goran Gotev, RABOTNICHESKO DELO special correspondent, and Vanyo Stoilov, oblast correspondent: "Model of Good-Neighborly Relations, Example of Cooperation" on second day of border meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Andreas Papandreou on 23 April in Khaskovo]

[Excerpts] Khaskovo, 23 April—The Bulgarian-Greek summit meeting ended with the signing of a joint declaration issued by Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council and Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of the Republic of Greece.

In the morning, the chairman of the State Council very cordially welcomed the Greek Government leader and the officials accompanying him, in the outskirts of Khaskovo. [passage omitted]

Answering the question of a Bulgarian journalist on the significance of Comrade Todor Zhivkov's visit to Alexandroupolis for Greece and Mr Andreas Papandreou's visit to Khaskovo for Bulgaria, the Greek prime minister stated:

President Todor Zhivkov's visit to Greece and, I hope, also my visit to Bulgaria, are of a symbolic significance; we shook hands across the border of two military-political blocs, in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons in the Balkans which threaten our lives and we are addressing a message to Europe and the world in this spirit. I would like to express my confidence that bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Greece which are so rapidly developing will set a good example for other Balkan states. [passage omitted]

Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs, declared in his turn: I would like to stress that during the talks Comrade Todor Zhivkov expressed cordial gratitude for the great hospitality with which the population in Alexandroupolis welcomed him. He greatly appreciated the spontaneous feelings expressed by the people who came to greet him and for the wish they expressed further to

develop our good-neighborly relations. The exceptional importance of the meeting was stressed on both sides during the talks. [passage omitted]

Dealing with the declaration signed by the two leaders and its connection with the task of eliminating nuclear weapons, Petur Mladenov stated among other things:

Every document signed by the two countries commits them through the clauses it contains. This also applies to the present Declaration which is in the spirit of the policy conducted by Bulgaria and Greece over several years and aimed at the freeing the Balkans of chemical and nuclear weapons. This, however, is the path toward the achievement of universal disarmament and elimination of nuclear arms all over the world.

Bulgarian Editorial

*AU2604115689 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 25 Apr 89 p 1*

[Editorial: "Bulgarian-Greece Relations—New Stage"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Obviously, the declaration of the two leaders is of the greatest importance for developing Bulgarian-Greek cooperation in the international arena. Its importance lies not only in confirming their determination to turn the territory of Bulgaria and Greece into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons, but also in the appeal toward other Balkan countries to free themselves from these deadly weapons. Indeed, the importance of the declaration is also underscored by its essentially being a new manifestation of the two countries' readiness to more actively develop political cooperation in asserting a climate of peace and international security.

The words of Comrade Todor Zhivkov are remarkable: We are searching for topical approaches to cooperation and understanding with all Balkan countries and would sincerely rejoice, if this Bulgarian-Greek dialogue, which has been going on for several decades, may become a dialogue encompassing the entire Balkan peninsula. This would be a great event in conformity with the new era and with the new political thinking. [passage omitted]

Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Viewed

Army Paper Commentary

*AU2504102289 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT
in Bulgarian 24 Apr 89 p 3*

[Vasil Asparukhov article: "From Positions of Real Disarmament"]

[Text] The USSR decision to reduce its military by 500,000 troops and simultaneously reduce the number of conventional weapons has become a convincing manifestation of the new political thinking, which is capable of finding a solution to problems that at first glance appear to be insoluble. The world assessed the political

decision to withdraw many USSR combat units from the territory of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia, and their disbandment as an act of goodwill.

The first stage of the partial withdrawal of USSR military units from Hungary begins on 25 April. Some 22 combat units will leave Hungary by the end of 1990. As a result of this the southern group of military forces will decrease by 10,000 troops. More than 450 tanks, over 200 guns and rocket launchers, and more than 3,000 vehicles and other equipment will be withdrawn.

Army General B. Spetkov commander-in-chief of the group of Soviet troops in the GDR, said:

—The Soviet troops in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Hungarian People's Republic will be reduced by more than 50,000 troops, while the number of our tanks in the region—by 5,300 units. All this is a convincing example of the precise and consistent manner in which the USSR is implementing the course of restructuring our Armed Forces on the principle of defense sufficiency. This course became possible thanks to the serious and positive changes that have been achieved in decreasing international tension.

We could add to this that the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact member countries eliminated to a large degree the imbalances in favor of the USSR that existed in certain kinds of weapons and Armed Forces. However, at the same time NATO's advantages in other areas remain. All this evokes serious concern in the USSR and the other socialist countries. Furthermore, until this moment one has not been able to notice any willingness on the part of the West to adopt any responsive measures.

It is especially important for the European peoples to turn the "old continent" into a continent of peace and understanding. This goal is in the center of the foreign policy activity of the socialist countries, which did a lot to actually bring it about. We would like to believe that the NATO member countries will demonstrate an analogous readiness.

Report on Start of Withdrawal

AU2704123289 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 26 Apr 89 pp 1, 5

[Milan Angelov, Budapest correspondent, report: "The First Units Are Moving Eastward"]

[Text] Budapest, 25 April—Numerous journalists attended the ceremony marking the beginning of the withdrawal of USSR troops from Hungary today.

Colonel Boris Adamenko told media representatives that the tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Zaytsev will be the first to be loaded, and that

it will depart today for the USSR. Some of the T-64 tanks will be used in the national economic sector, while others will serve for training in various units. Soldiers who have completed their regular military service will be discharged.

I asked Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Zaytsev, the regiment commander, to share his feelings:

[Zaytsev] We are implementing a particularly important party and government decision. Hungary is a beautiful country and we have to part with some very good friends. Nevertheless, there is nothing better than home, of course....

[Angelov] The loading operations of military technical equipment are beginning. Dozens of photographic and television cameras are focused on the railroad platform trying to record this important moment in the practical implementation of the Soviet Government's decision. I asked Sergey Arkadnev, a mechanic and driver, about his future plans:

[Arkadnev] During my military service in this unit I learned a profession which I will pursue at home: I would like to work as a mechanic in a kolkhoz. I also plan to continue my education.

[Angelov] Numerous local citizens and Hungarian soldiers have come to see off their Soviet friends.

In accordance with the agreement reached, the Soviet military command will hand over approximately 900 housing units and 19 barracks to the Hungarian Government. Nearly 40 construction projects, built by the Soviet troops with their own resources, will be released by 1990.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet Defense Minister Yazov Cited on Start of Troop Withdrawal

AU2504101289

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 22 April on page 1 carries a 120-word CTK report entitled "General D. Yazov: Soviet Airborne Battalion Withdrawn From the CSSR." The report cites the Soviet defense minister Yazov as having said in the referent IZVESTIYA interview that "within the framework of the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops," the Soviet Union has already withdrawn "one airborne battalion each from the CSSR and the GDR and more than 700 out of the planned 5,300 tanks." A 650-word CTK report on the Yazov interview, which quotes the same passage, is published also by Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 24 April on page 5.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Text of Foreign Minister Fischer's Speech at Geneva Disarmament Conference

AU2004135289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 19 Apr 89 pp 5-6

[Speech by GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva on 18 April: "Security Through Disarmament—Key to a Peaceful World"]

[Text] Mr Chairman:

First of all, permit me to express my gratitude for being given the opportunity to explain before this forum the GDR's attitude toward arms limitation and disarmament and, at the same time, to brief you on the important results of the Berlin session of the foreign ministers committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, which has just concluded.

The communique of this session noted that in international life progress in consolidating peace and disarmament creates favorable possibilities for expanding cooperation between states and peoples—regardless of the complicated and contradictory international situation. Realism and farsightedness demand that the favorable political conditions determinedly be placed in the service of disarmament.

Relations Increasingly Characterized by Turning Toward Detente

The turn from confrontation toward detente increasingly characterizes the bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations of the states.

- Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles are being destroyed in line with the agreements.
- The first confidence- and security-building measures decided upon in Stockholm are proving their worth in Europe.
- Gradually—even though not evenly and without disturbances in all places—the political settlement of regional conflicts is being initiated.
- The role of the United Nations in resolving regional conflicts has been intensified.
- At the beginning of the year the Paris conference on banning chemical weapons documented the international determination to forever banish death by chemical weapons as quickly as possible.

All this should encourage this conference here to provide new, important stimuli to the disarmament process and to achieve results. The GDR delegation will do everything for this.

I wish you, Mr Chairman, success in exercising your function.

Permit me to express my thanks to Ambassador Komatina, secretary general of the conference, for his long-standing, tireless work in the service of disarmament.

Ladies and gentlemen:

1. Security through disarmament is a command of reason and the key to a peaceful world.

Soon we will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the unleashing of World War II. "Never again fascism, never again war"—this vow of the antifascists who were freed from concentration camps and prisons in 1945 became a state doctrine with the founding of the GDR 40 years ago. This is all the more important today, for neo-Nazi groups are horrifyingly gaining ground in some countries and ultrarightists are being made presentable.

The socialist German state is doing everything so that war will never again start from German soil but only peace.

Therefore, historical experiences and our exposed location at the dividing line between the two alliances particularly determine our policy of dialogue and our work in the United Nations, at the Geneva disarmament conference, and in regional bodies.

Being aware of this great responsibility, we have proposed measures to increase security in the sensitive central European region. The GDR thus considered it its self-evident duty to promote the conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate-range missiles and to contribute to its implementation.

The GDR and Its Allies Do Not Leave It at Words

2. At the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures in Europe, the GDR and its allies are aiming at agreeing on a lower level of armed forces and all relevant categories of weapons. Surprise attacks must not be possible any longer. After the first round it has become evident that all participants want reductions with strict verification. This is a good common basis. Also, one cannot overlook differences which must be bridged with good will and good examples by everyone.

The common goal of a safe Europe in a safe world must have priority over one-sided alliance interests. This is how we understand a new way of thinking that is oriented toward the goal of cooperative security structures in Europe. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, the GDR and its allies did not leave it at words. Thus, at the beginning of this year the GDR decided to reduce its armed forces unilaterally and independent of negotiations by 10,000 men by the end of 1990, to cut its defense expenditure by 10 percent, to disband 6 tank regiments and 1 air squadron, and to reduce the number of weapons systems by 600 tanks and 50 combat planes.

The reductions will be started this month. The disbanding of the tank regiments will be concluded by the end of the year.

I would like to point out that the Warsaw Pact states are unilaterally reducing their armed forces by a total of 581,300 men. They will also eliminate 12,751 tanks; 10,030 artillery systems; 1,010 combat planes; 895 armed vehicles, and some tactical nuclear systems. These steps of the GDR, the USSR, and other socialist states are an unprecedented advance move. Like the data presented on the relations of power in Europe, they demonstrate the seriousness of our actions.

It is now time for the NATO member states to make a constructive response. New thinking and acting must be practiced by both sides.

To Start Separate Negotiations on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe Now

3. Only a few days ago the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states held a session in Berlin and affirmed a policy that is directed at a basic improvement of the situation in Europe and in the world.

The socialist states are in favor of intensifying political dialogue on the key question of international development. They call for a comprehensive approach to consolidating world peace and international security in line with the UN Charter, while steadily increasing the role and effectiveness of this international organization.

In their view, the time has come to intensify efforts everywhere to continue the disarmament process.

I would like to draw your attention to the statement on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which was adopted by the Berlin session. The Warsaw Pact states consider it necessary to broach this issue now and in this form, because:

First, the danger of a surprise attack and large-scale offensive actions cannot be eliminated as long as tactical nuclear weapons remain on the European Continent;

Second, their further existence might become an obstacle to the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe; their elimination, on the other hand, might promote these negotiations;

Third, a "modernization" or replenishing of tactical nuclear weapons would destabilize the military-strategic situation in Europe;

Fourth, it must not be neglected that tactical nuclear weapons might automatically start a large-scale nuclear conflict and that their speedy elimination, on the other hand, would favor worldwide nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, the allied socialist states propose to the NATO member states to begin separate negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

We attach great importance to efficient international verification of the reduction and elimination of these armaments. This could also include the establishment of an international control commission.

The Warsaw Pact states proceed from the premise that the unilateral reduction of their armed forces and armaments have improved the conditions for nuclear-free zones in Europe. This also applies to the initiatives of the GDR and the CSSR for creating a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe.

To Renounce Old Cliches of Military Strength

If the disarmament efforts are to be successful, old cliches of military strength and the striving for superiority have to be renounced. Thinking in categories of deterrence leads to the development of new threatening concepts and weapons systems and fans the arms race. Plans for new nuclear armaments in the immediate vicinity of the GDR are causing concern. They are aiming at undermining the INF Treaty. No matter whether it takes place in the nuclear or conventional area, every wave of armament contradicts the need to create more security and stability in a world with fewer weapons.

The peoples want neither the maintenance of "nuclear components" nor new means of destruction, but reliable cooperative security structures. The Berlin foreign ministers' meeting has provided new stimuli for this.

Ban on Chemical Weapons Assumes Central Position

Ladies and gentlemen:

4. The ban on chemical weapons assumes a central place in the work of this conference as a task that has to be fulfilled soon. A further global zero-option would be an important link in the chain of the overall disarmament process. In Berlin the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states affirmed their will to do everything they can in order to reach this goal as soon as possible.

The value of the Paris conference for the conclusion of this convention as soon as possible will now have to be measured against the extent to which all states are ready for practicable solutions.

Clear signals would be if, first, all states, which have such weapons, were to stop production already now and to begin with destroying the stockpiles;

Second, the other countries were to renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons.

Even before the conclusion of a conference this would counteract—vertically and horizontally—the proliferation of chemical weapons.

We welcome the decision of the Soviet Union to start the destruction of chemical weapons this year after their production has already been halted. The interest in a complete ban on chemical weapons, which was expressed by President George Bush, could be convincingly proved if the United States were to renounce, above all, the further production of binary weapons.

Important steps to intensify the negotiations were taken in the Chemical Weapons Committee, headed by Ambassador Pierre Morel, the representative of France. Now the time for a meeting of the disarmament conference at the foreign minister level seems to have come in order to ensure the purposeful completion of the convention. It could concentrate on the key questions, such as inspections in case of suspicions, composition and decisionmaking processes of the Executive Council of the future organization for chemical disarmament, and sanctions in case of treaty violations. The GDR would be ready to participate in this.

The verification measures that have to be put into the convention reach far into the civilian chemical industry. Its legitimate interests must be guarded, but they must not be used as an excuse in order to undermine the verification measures necessary for the convention.

The GDR Is Willing To Accept All Verification Measures

The GDR chemical industry is already supporting in varied ways the concern of the convention. The GDR is willing to accept all verification measures necessary for observing an agreement.

The GDR has already presented data on its chemical production relevant to the convention and carried out a national test inspection. As of May one facility in the Dresden Pharmaceutical Works is available for an international model inspection.

We agree with everyone who attach utmost political importance to working out the modalities and procedures for inspections in case of suspicions. Test inspections in the military area would also be useful. Ideas about the course of future inspections could be tested and further shaped.

We consider it conceivable to carry out test inspections "in case of suspicion" both on the bilateral and on the multilateral level. The GDR would, for instance, be willing to prepare such an inspection together with the FRG and to carry it out on the basis of reciprocity.

Transparency and openness establish favorable conditions for concluding and observing the convention.

The GDR is in favor of exploiting all possibilities that take us closer to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. A chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe, for instance, could be realized relatively quickly. We noted the announcement of the United States to study ways of accelerating the withdrawal of their chemical weapons from the FRG with interest. Would it not be logical to safeguard central Europe's freedom from chemical weapons with an international law document and to thus provide a strong impulse to the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons?

I repeat and affirm what was said both at the United Nations and at the Paris conference in January: The GDR does not have any chemical weapons and there are no such weapons belonging to other states deployed on its territory. It neither develops chemical weapons nor does it have facilities for their production. The GDR is willing to join a corresponding convention immediately after its conclusion.

Let 1989 become the decisive year for the ban on chemical weapons. Chemistry for life and not for death must determine everyone's actions.

Mr Chairman: A convention on a chemical-weapons ban would certainly also stimulate further global disarmament steps.

5. This particularly applies to the nuclear field.

The outstanding role of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in this connection is undisputed. We are in favor of the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, while adhering to the ABM Treaty. Any stop in disarmament negotiations favors the arms race because of the speed with which science and technology are developing today. SDI would not only be of no use for security but it would further destabilize security. What forum, if not the disarmament conference, would be more suitable to give the concept of a nuclear-free world shape, in particular since all nuclear states are represented here?

The first step could be the working out of principles for nuclear disarmament.

The final document of the first special UN session on disarmament and far-reaching proposals by the USSR, India, China, and other states are a solid starting basis for this. All relevant question, including the military doctrines, verification, and the connection between nuclear and conventional disarmament, should be included.

Important Initiative of the USSR for a Nuclear-Free World

The peoples of the world see that their vital interests are taken into account by decisions such as those announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in London, that is, that the USSR will cease production of enriched uranium for military purposes this year and will close down two more plutonium reactors. These are important steps for the complete cessation of production of fissionable material for armament purposes and thus for the implementation of the program for creating a nuclear-free world.

The GDR people call on the United States and the NATO states not only to renounce erecting obstacles on this path but decide to become reliable companions on this way, who are unerringly striving, together with everyone else, to reach the goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

A complete nuclear test ban would not only put up barriers against the proliferation of these weapons but also against their modernization. It would be the acid test for the will to cease the nuclear arms race. The nuclear powers are called upon to live up to their special responsibility.

The readiness repeatedly stated by the Soviet Union to return to a moratorium on all nuclear explosions if the United States agree to such a step is highly appreciated.

The disarmament conference should prepare the ground for the complete cessation of nuclear tests and should work out the elements of a corresponding multilateral treaty, including the necessary verification system. The GDR delegation presented detailed ideas on this in March.

Mr Chairman:

6. The disarmament conference has been assigned the working out of measures to prevent the arms race in space. The GDR has suggested an agreement on a ban of antisatellite weapons.

The abuse of space research and technology for military purposes would have unpredictable consequences for mankind. A preventive ban is necessary to nip things in the bud as long as there is still time.

Is it not better to use satellites to verify disarmament than for the purpose of destruction? Mankind needs the opening up of space for peaceful purposes.

War must be conquered in peace. Science and technology must not serve the arms race, they must serve disarmament and social and economic development.

There Must Be No Break in the Disarmament Process

"Many global problems are waiting to be solved by joint efforts of the international community," Erich Honnecker, general secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, said recently. "I am thinking of hunger and underdevelopment, of the threat to the environment and of diseases, but also of the peaceful use of space or of mastering the latest technologies for the benefit of mankind. Peace and disarmament are an indispensable precondition to make progress in this respect. Therefore the desire not to let any break occur in the disarmament process is mounting among the people in the world."

Ladies and gentlemen, the Disarmament Conference has a great responsibility for this.

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting Viewed
AU2504101689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 22-23 Apr 89 p 2

[Editorial by "NG": "Maneuvering in Brussels"]

[Text] The NATO Nuclear Planning Group spring meeting in Brussels was overshadowed by far-reaching differences on the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. This problem was discussed, but no decision has been made, it was said. In the communique on the meeting of defense ministers from 16 member states, the controversial problem was not even mentioned.

Nobody can be surprised at all this. Several days ago, the allied socialist states proposed to the NATO countries separate negotiations on a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Competent Soviet military officials rejected imputations that the USSR has modernized its missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers. How serious socialism is about disarmament, is shown by the one-sided force reductions on the part of the Warsaw Pact—581,300 troops and tens of thousands of weapons, including various tactical nuclear systems. All these offers, clarifications, and advance concessions have had an effect on the West. In view of the nonexistent "threat from the East," those holding government responsibility in a number of NATO countries are finding it increasingly difficult to explain to their voters why a new round of the nuclear arms race is to be started.

These are also the causes of the maneuvering at the NATO meeting. The differences were pasted over with the old formula "to keep the nuclear forces at the required level where this is necessary." However, there is a perfidious game behind this sentence which can be interpreted in two or three ways. It says that in principle, NATO advocates a modernization of short-range nuclear weapons. A definitive decision on their deployment will be made only after 1991-92, in other words, after the FRG Bundestag elections. However, in the meantime, the United States will develop and build the Lance

follow-up systems with ranges of a little less than 500 kilometers, which will then "only" have to be deployed in due time. In this sense, the U.S. defense secretary also assessed the Brussels results as fully sufficient to ask Congress in Washington to appropriate the required means.

It must be added that those who had hoped to get an answer to the question as to whether and how NATO will take up the Warsaw Pact's negotiation offer, were put off—to the NATO summit late in May. As FRANK-FURTER RUNDSCHAU has stated, prior to this summit, the struggle for the most handy empty formula is in full swing, "and the danger is growing that a disarmament opportunity will be missed."

Honecker Discusses Arms Issues With Visiting Lower Saxony Premier

Honecker on Troops Cuts, SNF
*LD2704144789 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1055 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Social Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR's State Council, today met Ernst Albrecht, minister president of Lower Saxony and deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, for talks at the State Council building.

During the meeting, which took place in a businesslike atmosphere, international issues and relations between the GDR and the FRG as well as between the GDR and Lower Saxony were the focus of attention.

Both parties agreed that the most important issue of the moment is, and remains, securing peace, achieving disarmament, and preventing the danger of nuclear war. This is the main task of any responsible policy. Both German states, which make a weighty contribution to achieving the treaty on the removal of medium-range missiles, must do everything to positively influence international developments and to support further disarmament measures. This is mainly true concerning halving the USSR's and the U.S. strategic offensive weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons and drastic offensive weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons, and drastic conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Erich Honecker stressed that the GDR supports the USSR's unilateral disarmament measures and that the withdrawal of the first units announced by the Soviet Union has already begun.

Erich Honecker said that, as already announced, the GDR National Defense Council has decided to reduce the National People's Army [NPA] by 10,000 men, 600 tanks, and 50 aircraft and lower national defense expenditure by 10 percent unilaterally and independent of

negotiations by 1990. To give the NPA an even more pronounced defensive character, among other measures six tank regiments and a squadron of aircraft will be disbanded.

The progressive disbanding of the tank regiments is to begin during the next few days, with the planned release of conscripts from these troop units, and will be completed by October 1989. The fighter squadron will also be disbanded by the end of this year. By this time 50 planes and more than 400 tanks will have already been taken out of service.

The NPA troop units to be disbanded are: Tank Regiment 1 in Berlitz; Tank Regiment 4 in Gotha; Tank Regiment 8 in Goldberg; Tank Regiment 11 in Sonderhausen; Tank Regiment 16 in Grossenhain; Tank Regiment 23 in Stallberg; and Fighter Squadron 7 in Drewitz. Erich Honecker said that as a further measure and expression of goodwill, we have taken the decision to employ 11,500 army members, after a short period of military training, in key sectors of the national economy for the period of 15 months of their active military service.

This step benefits our people and once more underlines our readiness to further reduce military confrontation in the heart of Europe on a mutual basis. It becomes obvious what opportunities would open up for all nations to solve economic and social problems, as well as environmental protection problems, if NATO could also decide to advance the disarmament process through its own specific contributions. We would give representatives of the domestic and foreign media the opportunity to report on our unilateral disarmament measures.

It is necessary in the interest of peace to negotiate swiftly and constructively at the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament and confidence building. It is a matter of reducing asymmetries on both sides, and further reducing forces and arms below the upper limits then achieved, in order to create a state of mutual nonattack capability.

The reduction and removal of tactical nuclear weapons, Erich Honecker stressed, is of vital importance to both German states. Talks should be started on this without delay as the [words indistinct] have recently proposed in Berlin. In this context Erich Honecker pointed to the significance of regional solutions such as the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and zone of trust and security in central Europe. The GDR resolutely opposes all efforts to compensate for medium-range missiles by new, modern weapons in the short-range area. That can only contribute to unleashing a fresh round of arming. Both sides should renounce the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Taking part in the talk were: Guenter Mittag, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee and deputy chairman of the State Council; State

Secretary Frank-Joachim Herrmann, chief of the Chancery of the chairman of the State Council; Guenter Rettner, director of the International Politics and Economics Department of the SED Central Committee; Karl Seidel, director of the West Germany Department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry; Heinrich Juergens, Lower Saxony minister for federal and European affairs; Werner Remmers, Lower Saxony minister for the environment; Josef Meyer, head of the Lower Saxony State Chancery; Fritz Brickwedde, spokesman of the Lower Saxony State Government; and Dr Franz Bertele, head of the FRG Permanent Mission.

Honecker Hosts Lunch

*LD2704145589 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1330 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and chairman of the GDR's State Council, today held a lunch in honor of Dr Ernst Albrecht, prime minister of Lower Saxony and Christian Democratic Union deputy chairman in Berlin.

Taking part in the meal were SED Central Committee Politburo members Joachim Herrman, Werner Jarowinski, Egon Krenz, Guenther Kleiber, Werner Krolkowski and Guenter Mittag; state secretaries Frank-Joachim Herrmann and Dr Alexander Schalck-Golodowski; the director of the SED Central Committee's International Politics and Economics Department, Guenter Rettner; Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Kurt Nier; as well as other persons. Among the guests was the head of the FRG's Permanent Mission, Dr Franz Bertele.

Talks Termed 'Constructive'

*LD2704193389 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1441 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—His talks with General Secretary Erich Honecker were very intensive and constructive, stated Lower Saxony's Premier Ernst Albrecht on Thursday [27 April] at an international news conference in Berlin. It was the second time that he personally had the opportunity to speak with Erich Honecker on joint problems. It is no secret that there are considerable differences between the two countries on social questions and the concept of the state and its tasks and organization. But they jointly established that there are very many joint interests and problems which, in spite of these differences, must be solved. They also established that it is both in the interests of the people as well as in the interest of the preservation of peace in Europe that the two German states expand their cooperation. [passage omitted]

Ernst Albrecht then answered questions saying that the visit showed that one could achieve progress, and what is more, substantial progress without conceding fundamental positions. On questions of security and disarmament they were able to establish that there are now fortunately

few differences of opinion in the fundamental objectives. It is true that the FRG does not share the views of the GDR with regard to a divergence of the military blocs or with regard to the creation of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones, but they are in complete agreement in the desire to see strategic nuclear weapons of the great powers reduced by 50 percent. He continued, saying that we completely agree that we want to have, if possible, a ban on chemical weapons in the world, but in any case such a ban between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

We agree on wanting to reduce conventional weapons with short-range missile levels to such a balance that in the final result neither one side nor the other is left with an offensive capability. There must be talks and discussions on what that balance is and how one preserves it and achieves it at a lower level. He valued the fact that a decisionmaking process is taking place within NATO and that NATO as a whole is putting forward disarmament proposals, that is, itself taking initiatives.

Premier Albrecht told the journalists of the announcement by Erich Honecker that the GDR is not only reducing the required strength of the People's Army by 10,000 men, but will also introduce a new regulation to the effect that a further 11,500 conscripts will, after 3 months of basic military service, serve as soldiers in the economy taking part in production. This regulation is new for him, Ernst Albrecht remarked. "And I see it as a quite remarkable decision which underlines that the GDR is, for its part, also serious concerning that which it has said to us, namely that it is ready to contribute on the path toward disarmament."

In response to further questions the prime minister said that he suggested the incorporation of Hannover in local border traffic. Erich Honecker agreed to look at this proposal. There is no change with regard to the differing views on the so-called Salzgitter Registration Office, Ernst Albrecht remarked. But he did not have the impression that the GDR is making a connection between this and other questions. Albrecht was more precise about his proposal for a joint environmental fund, saying that this should be financed on an equal basis by both sides. He added that his federal state already uses at present technology from the GDR in this area, for example through the application of enzymatic sludge treatment at sewage works. When questioned, Franz Bertele, head of the FRG permanent mission, said that according to the GDR, the extent of travel between the GDR and the FRG increased in the first 3 months of this year when compared with the same period last year by 20 to 25 percent.

His discussion with Erich Honecker was "an extremely pleasant, constructive, very earnest talk," the prime minister said in summation. He is convinced that all efforts to intensify relations between both German states are in the interests of the people in these states and in the interests of peace.

Unilateral Force Reduction, Transfers Begin

Six Tank Regiments Disbanding

LD2804093189 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0823 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The unilateral disarmament initiative announced by the GDR began today with the progressive disbandment of a total of six tank regiments of the National People's Army. The first battle tanks will be removed and conscripted tank troops will be transferred to the reserve. Representatives of the National Defense Ministry in the "Artur Backer" 8th Tank Regiment in Goldberg, Schwerin Area, said this morning that draftees from other tank troop units in Belitz, Gotha, Sondershausen, Grossenhain, and Stallberg are being discharged. Their service posts will not be filled in the future. At the same time part of the structural combat technology [strukturmaessige Kampftechnik] is being removed for scrapping or for use in the national economy. The disbandment of the six armored units will be completed by October 1989.

At a ceremonial parade in Goldberg Garrison the troops will be thanked for loyally performing their military duty for the reliable protection of socialism and peace.

Further on Reductions

LD2804111389 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0932 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] Schwerin (ADN)—The GDR today started to implement its previously announced unilateral disarmament initiatives. In the agro-industrial town of Goldberg in the Schwerin area, which has 5,000 inhabitants, the first tanks and crews were decommissioned from the National People's Army (NPA) this morning. Eighty-five representatives of the international press were eyewitnesses to the start of the NPA troop and equipment reductions. At the "Artur Becker" 8th tank regiment, which has been stationed here for 25 years, they learned details of the disbandment of six armored regiments and a fighter aircraft squadron by October 1989.

Defense Ministry representatives explained how the unilateral disarmament measures announced by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, are being implemented. During a meeting yesterday with Lower Saxony Minister President Ernst Albrecht, Erich Honecker announced that the regular release of conscripts in Goldberg and the other five tank troop units marked the start. The journalists were told that the soldiers would not be replaced.

The locations of the NPA troop units being disbanded were shown on a map: the 1st tank regiment in Berlitz (Potsdam area), the 4th tank regiment in Gotha (Erfurt area), the 8th tank regiment in Goldberg, the 11th tank regiment in Sondershausen (Erfurt area), the 16th tank regiment in Grossenhain (Dresden area), the 23 tank

regiment in Stallberg (Neubrandenbrug area), and 7th fighter squadron in Drewitz (Cottbus area). The structural combat equipment will be removed today, it was explained, initially in battalion strength of 31 tanks for scrapping or use in the national economy. The troop units mentioned will be finally disbanded this autumn. In the future, the barracks will serve as the base for those conscripts who, as Erich Honecker also announced yesterday, after a short period of military training will work for 15 months of their actual [as opposed to reserve] military service in key sectors of the national economy.

HUNGARY

Hungary's Goal: NATO, Warsaw Pact To Be Dissolved 'This Century'

AU2404183789 Budapest MTI in English
1606 GMT 24 Apr 89

[Excerpts] Budapest, MTI, 24/04/1989—The current social and political changes and reform processes in Hungary, and the country's main foreign policy endeavours were addressed by Gyula Horn, state secretary of foreign affairs, at an international news conference held on Monday [24 April] on the occasion of the 35th Congress of the Radical Party in Budapest. [passage omitted]

Our national and international endeavours start out from the exact realities and requirements of the civilized world. We are open to the new international initiatives for the considerable reduction of conventional weapons, for the updating of the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, the establishing of new economic security, and new handling of local hotbeds of tension. The age of declaring monolithic unity within the alliance system is over. Today national characteristics are decisive and the individual prosperity of member states serves the common interest. Addressing Hungarian-Romanian relations, Mr Horn emphasized that the conflict does not arise from differing interests of the two peoples, and pointed out that fundamental political differences cause tension. The Hungarian side takes the view that universal human norms and requirements should be considered in the nationality issue and the enforcement of individual freedoms.

It is our long-term goal that the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO be dissolved simultaneously and if possible this century, Mr Horn said, and added that Hungary would like to become a bloc-free country. According to the Hungarian position, the Warsaw Treaty should not intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Hungary respects the national characteristics of all allied countries and requires the same. It strives for consultations rather than coordination within the Warsaw Treaty. If the alliance system were to bring a decision of great importance, it would be up to the national parliaments to decide. It is highly important for the alliance system not to hinder the sovereign foreign policy steps of member

states. The radical reduction of the joint armed forces and the national armies, and their transformation into defensive forces should be put on the agenda, he said. [passage omitted]

In reply to questions, the state secretary said that the full withdrawal of Soviet troops depended a great deal on the outcome of the Vienna talks. He expressed the hope that an agreement might be reached in Vienna this year or the first half of 1990. [passage omitted]

Partial Withdrawal of Soviet Forces Begins

*LD2504164589 Budapest MTI in English
1525 GMT 25 Apr 89*

[Text] Budapest, April 25 (MTI)—The start of partial withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary took place today with the loading of thirty-one Soviet tanks on to railway carriages in Kiskunhalas (E. Hungary), to return to the Soviet Union. Withdrawal of armoured and missile artillery will be completed in the area by the end of May and barracks vacated will be occupied by troops being moved from western parts of the country.

Boris Adamenko, deputy chief of the Soviet southern troops, reported that the T-64 type tanks will be transferred to a storage base in the Ukraine. A few will be taken over by training units, and the majority dismantled and usable parts given to Soviet farms.

With the completion of partial withdrawals, ten military posts, consisting of 19 barracks, auxiliary buildings and 900 flats, will be given over to the Hungarian side, Mr Adamenko said. The withdrawals, envisaging the departure of forces numbering over 10,000, (including family members of some 1,800 persons) is to be implemented in two stages, continuing next year. It involves the return of 450 tanks, 200 cannons, and mine-throwers and over 3,000 vehicles.

From Sarbogard, the other venue of withdrawals, evacuation is to commence on May 19, with the whole division to depart from the area, vacating the barracks.

Further Cuts in Arms, Military Spending Prepared

Foreign Minister Kovacs' Comments

*LD2704170789 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Deputy Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has indicated that Hungary is preparing to further reduce its armaments and to introduce significant cuts in military spending. In a speech given at an international conference in Geneva, he also said that Hungary wishes to reform its security policy. This means that in foreign policy and military affairs we would place the greatest emphasis on the economic needs of the country and the fact that, for Hungary, joining in the work of integrational organizations is of vital importance.

Further on Kovacs' Remarks

*LD2704182489 Budapest MTI in English
1648 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Geneva, April 27 (MTI)—Laszlo Kovacs, deputy minister of foreign affairs held a lecture today in Geneva on Hungary's foreign and security policy, as part of the international conference series held by the Institute of International Studies and the East-West Security Research Institute.

He stated that in the current favourable international situation, the security and stability of Hungary is endangered not by a possible bloc conflict but by the challenges arising from global social-economic, technological, and ecological competition.

Foreign financial and technical-scientific sources which include the development of the cooperation with the developed industrial countries and integration organizations are indispensable for the implementation of the reforms.

Mr Kovacs pointed out that the reform in national security policy will take into account the nation's genuine requirement of security and its present economic situation. We are to formulate a defence oriented military structure that would significantly reduce military expenditure, the deputy minister of foreign affairs said.

BRAZIL

Satellite Launch Vehicle Not To Be Ready Before 1992

PY2404170489 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Apr 89 p 10

[Text] The launching of the entirely Brazilian-made satellite has been postponed once again by the National Institute of Space Research (INPE). The SCD-1 satellite will now be ready in June 1990. At least 3 months will be needed to make the preparations at the launch site in Alcantara, Maranhao State, and so the satellite will be ready to be placed in orbit in September 1990.

The new timetable implies a delay of 1 year over previous predictions. Along with the efforts to complete the construction of the satellite, which has already cost \$118 million, the country is making efforts to build, using its own technical resources, the Satellite Launching Vehicle (VLS) through the Space Activities Institute (IAE), a branch of the Aeronautics Ministry. The problem is that the VSL construction timetable is delayed even further, and it will certainly not be completed before 1992.

The INPE decision to delay by 12 months the satellite launch will be announced over the next few days to the Brazilian Space Activities Commission (COBAE), the agency that coordinates the entire program. With this, the Brazilian program is setting aside a political problem: If the satellite is ready this year, well ahead of the VLS, a foreign launching agency would have to be contracted. The VSL would only be used in future missions. The possibility of having to hire a foreign launching agency is opposed by the military who insist that the plans of the Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) must be maintained.

The SCD-1 will be placed in a 750-km high orbit for 1 year, at a speed of 27,000 km per hour, orbiting the earth in 1 hour and 40 minutes. Its function will be to collect meteorological information (temperature, water levels in rivers and dams, air and soil humidity content, sunlight time, rain volume, and others) from 10 land stations around the nation's territory where there are no phones.

The information collected by the satellite will be transmitted at least six times per day to a receiving land station in Cuiaba, Mato Grosso, for distribution to consumers around the country.

INDIA

Further Reports on Progress of Planned Agni IRBM Test

Test Rescheduled for 1 May

BK2704112089 Hong Kong AFP in English 1102 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] New Delhi, April 27 (AFP)—India will again try to launch its first ballistic missile on May 1 after aborting the blast-off four times this month, the PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) reported Thursday.

India's intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), called Agni (fire), is scheduled to be launched between 6:00 a.m. (0030 GMT) and 3:00 p.m. (0900 GMT) on May 1 from the Chandipur area, 150 kilometres south-west from Calcutta, PTI said.

Technical snags that led to the postponement of Agni's launch four times since April 20 have been rectified and the missile is ready for the trial, the news agency quoted official sources at the launch pad as saying.

The missile, which has a range of 2,500 kilometres, is targeted to land in the Bay of Bengal between Sri Lanka and India's Andaman group of islands.

PTI said administrators of eastern Orissa state had warned civilians living near the launch site that Agni's blast-off was now scheduled during the first two weeks of May.

Missile experts postponed Agni's launch during the last moments of a final countdown on April 20 following technical snags believed to be in the IRBM's ignition systems.

The test fire was cancelled three more times in as many subsequent days because of unspecified reasons amid rumours that anti-missile protesters had sabotaged power cables to the launch pad.

Resistance from some 10,000 villagers had scuttled Agni's launch in the past because of fears that it could lead to destruction of homes and crops.

The Indian Government says it would pay 80 rupees (five dollars) to each of the farmers who are asked to temporarily abandon their home and lands at the time of Agni's launch, but most Chandipur residents have rejected the offer.

Launch Delayed Again

BK0105085889 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0830 GMT 1 May 89

[Text] The test firing the country's first ever intermediate range ballistic missile—Agni—has again been postponed following detection of a data error in one of its

subsystems. A Defense Ministry spokesman said in New Delhi today that the error was detected by the computer during the final stages of the automatic count down sequence.

The spokesman said the mission authorities decided to postpone the launch to rectify the error and continue with their efforts.

U.S. Criticism Called 'Unfair'

BK3004080489 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0730 GMT 30 Apr 89

[Text] India has told the United States that it is unfair on Washington's part to single out her ballistic missile program for criticism. The Indian ambassador to the United States, Mr P.K. Kaul, has told the Bush administration that there was no logic in singling out India when several other countries have developed similar missiles without attracting sanctions.

Moves are afoot in the U.S. Congress to impose trade sanctions against India for developing ballistic missiles. The Indian ambassador told the under secretary of state, Mr Robert Kimmitt, that India's missile program is purely an indigenous effort meant for the country's development.

Editorial Assails U.S. Pressure Over Agni Missile

BK2504142189 Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi 18 Apr 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Already Under Fire"]

[Text] India is yet to test fire its first 2,500-kilometer range missile "Agni" [fire], but it has already ignited a fire of jealousy in some countries. Attempts are being made to prevent India from testing the Agni. The United States is the most concerned of all of them. The senior officials of the Bush administration have admitted that the United States is very worried and has told India that the Agni test could take the warmth out of the relations. The arguments given by Democrat Senator Jeff Bingaman against India's ballistic missile program reflects this concern.

Senator Bingaman says that if India carries out this test, it will damage its image as a world's leading peace-loving nation. He believes that Sino-Indian relations will definitely deteriorate because China's major cities will come within the striking distance of the Agni, while the new phase of relations recently begun with Pakistan will deteriorate and the old arms race will be rekindled.

Senator Bingaman should know that it has been years since China built its medium-range nuclear missiles. Its short-range "Silkworm" missiles had already become a dangerous weapon in Iranian hands during the Gulf war. Saudi Arabia has received Chinese missiles, while others like Syria are waiting in the wings. On the other hand, Pakistan recently successfully tested 80-kilometer and

300-kilometer range missiles. Is New Delhi not within the striking distance of Chinese and Pakistani missiles? If Sino-Indian and Indian-Pakistani relations are witnessing an upward trend irrespective of the presence of these missiles, why should these relations cool down after the firing of Agni?

India should improve its relations as long as it is weak, but a strong India invites objections from America. This is a strange reasoning. Why is America bothered about India's peace-loving image? Obviously, these are mild arguments. If the United States cannot give up its "Star Wars" program and stop modernizing short-range nuclear missiles in Europe in spite of extraordinary peace signals from Moscow, why should India stop? The United States, in fact, is afraid of India's becoming a decisive force in South Asia.

The Bush administration, following the footsteps of the Reagan administration, believes that it is the responsibility of the United States to prevent the spread of missile production in the world. First of all, the testing of Agni does not mean that India wants to join the arms race. And even if it were so, who has given this responsibility to the United States? A member of the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee, John McCain, recently said that legislation should be passed limiting dealings with countries like India, Pakistan, China, and Libya who are engaged in missiles production.

U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle had already prepared a formal report on means to prevent Third World countries from producing missiles. In this context it is possible that the United States becomes provoked and Pakistan and China begrudge this month's planned test in Orissa, but India should remain firm because the cruel fact is that only when we look strong are we respected.

Editorial Urges Agni Missile Test Despite U.S. 'Advice'

BK2304083989 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 17 Apr 89 p 11

[Editorial: "Go Ahead With Agni"]

[Text] US Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman has been less than fair to India in advising it to desist from the proposed testing of the Agni missile. His concern is unexceptionable; he feels that India's stature as a peaceful world leader would be damaged if it perfected a missile with a 2,500-kilometre range. Mr Bingaman's sentiments for India's reputation are worthy of respect. What is less easy to comprehend is his reasoning. He believes India's relations with China would be damaged since several major Chinese cities would be within the range of Agni.

Of equal concern to him is the likelihood of the Indian missile programme triggering an arms race with Pakistan at the cost of friendly relations between them. Although India has been traditionally denigrated by Americans for

what they call its self-righteousness, historically it can be contested that there never has been a dearth of matching homilies from the United States. Unfortunately, Mr Bingaman's advice falls in this category, and is apt to be taken as counsel designed to thwart India's efforts at self-reliance. Such efforts do not end with a green revolution, a liberalised industrial policy and an extra-receptive ear to the World Bank-IMF pundits.

Successive Indian leadership has nurtured the notion that self-reliance extends beyond economic endeavour and, in fact, hinges on a quantum jump in the development of science and technology. What is surprising is that US leaders do not seem to grudge China the right to work for scientific advances. Beijing's nuclear and space programme is in perfect order; its missiles can be trained on Indian cities, and East Wind could travel to Saudi Arabia and Silkworms to the warring nations in the Persian Gulf. But India must be prevented from devising a defence system against possible Chinese attack. This is not sound logic.

Mr Bingaman's views might not have received serious notice had there not been a lurking suspicion that he might not be quite unrepresentative of official US thinking. In any case, a report that Vice President Dan Quayle prepared last year, six months before he was picked up by Mr George Bush as his running mate in the Presidential election, is revealing. The thrust of Mr Quayle's report is to evolve a strategy to thwart the attempts of a number of Third World countries, including India, from acquiring missile capability.

Security and defence matters are among Mr Quayle's areas of specialisation, and it will be surprising if his expertise goes entirely unused by the US administration. And, because of this possibility, India should be wary of gratuitous advice, such as has come from Mr Bingaman. The unrelenting pressure on India for restricting its nuclear and space research betrays a distressing degree of mistrust in this country's sense of responsibility. It is unfortunate, but not strong enough reason for India's decision-makers to feel inhibited. They should go ahead with the Agni missile programme.

IRAQ

Armitage Statement on 'Common' Missile Defense Policy with Israel Hit

JN2404132489 Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
21 Apr 89 p 2

["A Stand" column by Ra'fat Haddad: "Washington-Tel Aviv: An Anti-Arab Aggressive Coordination"]

[Text] The United States shows daily stands that are supportive for, harmonious with, and identical to the Zionist entity's anti-Arab orientations. Those orientations are based on the policy of expansion, aggression, encroachment, tampering, and recklessness at the pretext of safeguarding Israel's allegedly jeopardized security.

It is certain that the constant U.S. policy on this issue has been embodied by scores of stands taken by the White House over many years regardless of the administration in charge and under the direct influence of the Zionist lobby in the United States.

Definitely, the statements of Richard Armitage, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, cannot be dissociated from this policy, which is identical in all its dimensions with the Tel Aviv stand.

Armitage made an exclusive statement to AFP, in which he said: "The United States and Israel have a common problem in confronting the surface-to-surface missiles. Their cooperation within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the star wars, is to solve this problem."

He added: "Israel faces a big problem regarding the surface-to-surface missile, and so do we."

He said: "Our cooperation will focus on the initiative problems [as published], which include these missiles. This clearly applies to some of those who want to harm Israel."

It is understood from the U.S. official's remarks that the source of danger threatening Israel is the Arab countries and that Washington and Tel Aviv have coordinated their efforts to confront this danger.

This means that the White House has introduced the Zionist entity into its Strategic Defense Initiative after having concluded a strategic alliance with it to jointly confront the alleged Arab threat.

There is nothing new at all in this stand by Washington. This is because the Arab nation, based on experience, realizes well that Washington has only been in the hostile Zionist trench. It has not halted for one moment its political, economic, military, and moral support for its strategic ally in Tel Aviv.

However, the issue that arouses questions, doubts, and suspicion is: Why is Washington behaving like that at this time in particular, while, as a superpower, it is supposed to ease tensions and spread stability in the entire world and this region?

This is especially since Washington seeks through this orientation to achieve a number of objectives, headed by the attempt to save the Zionist entity, its aggressive spearhead in the region, from its historic impasse and great embarrassment it has become involved in following the changes which took place in the region.

The current Zionist impasse is represented by the continuing mammoth Palestinian intifadah [uprising] in the occupied territories, which rocked the internal Zionist

"security" and placed it in a historical crisis that culminated with the declaration of and international support for the independent Palestinian state.

It is also represented by the great Iraqi victory against Iran, the Zionist entity's closest ally in the region. Iraq emerged from the war triumphant, familiar with the details of science and technology, and creative in its dealing with this technology.

Thus, it broke "the myth of Israeli superiority" and created a balance of power between the Arab nation on the one hand and Tel Aviv and its supporters on the other. This did not please the Zionist entity and circles, so much so that they began saying "Iraq's power freezes blood in veins."

From the same perspective, Zionism began to launch regular propaganda campaigns against Iraq and the Arab nation in a bid to disturb this superiority and harm the new Arab era that emerged from Iraq.

Undoubtedly, Armitage's statements fall within the media campaign against Iraq and the Arab nation, the campaign that aims at depriving them of possessing advanced technology and allowing the Zionist entity to achieve superiority over the Arab nation so it can consecrate its occupation of the Arab territories.

Washington's hints that the Zionist entity is facing a certain threat indicates that an agreement was reached behind the scenes to carry out a new aggression against Iraq and the Arab nation.

But those parties had better know that Iraq and the Arab nation are able to face up to the challenge, and that the past years provided them with various capabilities and experiences enabling them to retaliate strongly and violently to any act of aggression, and by means that may appear as the surprise of the confrontation field. This will be in defense of right and in retaliation to any harm or wrong done to the nation.

The time of "colonialism" has gone. This is the time of the lively and developing peoples, who can defend their sovereignty, dignity, and ambition for progress and development.

Washington should understand this fact and reconsider its cards and calculations in the region. If it is dealing with the Zionist entity on the basis that this entity is part of it, complementary to its security, and protector of its interests, it should realize that the Arabs, to whose rights and causes it turns a blind eye and opposes, can reshuffle its cards and affect its interests in the region.

**New 1,000-KM Range Missile Project Said
Nearing Completion**

*PM2704084689 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 24 Apr 89 pp 1-2*

[Alan George Report: "Exclusive AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Report: "Iraq About To Complete Project for Production of Missile With 1,000-km Range"]

[Excerpt] London, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—With assistance from European companies, Iraq is about to complete a secret missile production project, named "DOT."

The project is believed to be connected with the development of warheads for the Condor-2 missile in cooperation with Argentina and Egypt.

The two-stage missile, which is propelled by solid fuel, has a range of 1,000 km, and weighs 500 kg, will succeed the Condor-1 which Argentina manufactured in late 1970's with assistance from the West German aerospace company Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB).

As AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT mentioned last month, the major role in the manufacture of Condor-2 was played by a group of Swiss companies headed by the Zug Company [Cutsin] in which former MBB engineers played key roles. [passage omitted]

ISRAEL

Navy Officer on Antichemical Warfare Systems

*TA2804152289 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1400 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Text] The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has developed defensive systems for Naval vessels against chemical warfare. The systems are drilled every few months. This was stated by the head of the Doctrine and Training Department of the navy to the navy publication BEN HAGALIM [BETWEEN THE WAVES]. Our army affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe reports that the organ publishes data on some of the defensive measures.

These measures include new sprinkler systems which are permanently fitted into hydrants on deck. Hoses, operated by sea water pressure, spray off chemical agents. There is also a system to bring clean air into the ship by filtering it through a special filter.

Editorials Laud Vienna CSCE Concluding Document

Aspects of 'Common European Home'

18070520 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 5, 27 Jan-2 Feb 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Foundation of the 'European Home'"]

[Text] The productive conclusion of the Vienna meeting was made possible by the goodwill of all its participants, their sense of responsibility, their realism, their political will, their attempts to give one another's interests equal consideration, and their mutual search for reasonable compromises to strengthen the bases of cooperation in Europe. The meeting owed its success to several favorable circumstances in today's world: the progress in Soviet-American relations, particularly the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the relaxation of international tension, the reinforcement of East-West relations, and the progress in the resolution of disarmament issues and the settlement of regional conflicts. The dialogue between Moscow and Washington provided momentum for the search for solutions in the sphere of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. Processes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy and perestroika had a beneficial impact. The vigorous democratization of Soviet society with the simultaneous precise defense of our principles have also influenced the unconstructive position of the West by inclining it toward consent. As all observers agreed, M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the United Nations marked the beginning of the move toward the quick drafting of the concluding document and the conclusion of the Vienna meeting.

We must admit that the Vienna meeting was distinguished by intense political battles. The differences in the positions of the participating states, including differences in matters of principle, were significant, and the road to the conclusion of the work of the meeting with meaningful agreements was long and hard. Several of our Western partners tried to distort the essence and purpose of the all-European process in such a way as to reduce it to isolated questions of human rights with a biased interpretation and a disregard for other major and truly cardinal aspects of security and cooperation in Europe. Nevertheless, in spite of the natural "potholes" represented by diverging views and the artificial obstacles, the participants were able to lay the foundation for the "European home" they hope to build. The role of the neutral and non-aligned countries, which made such a great effort to serve as coordinators during the drafting of a mutually acceptable document, warrants special mention.

The more than 100 pages of the concluding document and its appendices represent a massive program of agreements and pledges by countries participating in the development and reinforcement of cooperation in all areas of contemporary international life.

The greatest achievement in safeguarding security and cooperation in Europe is the agreement on ways of advancing the cause of disarmament on our continent and beginning the planning and organization of a new group of measures to strengthen trust and security. Two sets of talks will begin in Vienna in March—one set between the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO (there are 23 of them) on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and another set of talks between all participants in the Vienna meeting on a new generation of security and confidence-building measures on our continent.

Today it is impossible to win the arms race, but it is possible to destroy civilization. The safeguarding of security is taking shape as a process by which all states will work together to establish political, military, legal, material, organizational, and other guarantees of peace that will exclude the very possibility of war.

Agreements satisfactory to all parties were reached in the part of the document defining the principles of the all-European process. They record statements of principle regarding respect for national legislation and the rights of states to choose and develop their own political, social, economic, and cultural systems and establish their own laws and administrative regulations. An agreement was reached on the statement regarding the territorial integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the common struggle against terrorism. Another important agreement was reached on the need for the CSCE countries to take measures to coordinate their laws, practices, and policies with their own international legal obligations and signed agreements.

Important results were achieved in decisions on the matters making up the so-called "second basket" (economic, scientific, technical, and environmental issues). The importance of cooperation in these areas has increased immeasurably. It took some effort to elevate them from the status of a "stepchild" of the all-European process. As a result, the concluding document contains important statements on the development of trade, the reduction and elimination of accumulated obstacles to trade, the expansion of scientific and technical cooperation, the encouragement of industrial cooperation, and so forth. Within the context of the development of the Helsinki process, the establishment of official relations between CEMA and the EEC should be regarded as a step toward the creation of a single European economy and the reinforcement of the economic foundation of the "common European home."

The new political thinking takes in all spheres of international relations, including human rights and humanitarian issues. This was the most difficult area for agreements because the issues included in the "third basket" are directly related to the ideologies and practices of

countries of different social and political systems: inter-personal contacts, exit visas, the activities of unofficial associations, information, culture, education, and the legal aspects of these issues.

Respect for human rights is an important factor contributing to peace and justice, and the humanitarian sphere is regarded as one of the bases of a comprehensive system of international security. In our country we hope to develop and intensify the democratization of all spheres of public life, and the entire group of the sociopolitical and personal rights and liberties of the Soviet individual should serve this goal. The human factor is becoming the main driving force of the ongoing revolutionary perestroika. Massive efforts are being made in the USSR for the organization of a just society and for the expansion of the bases of international humanitarian cooperation within this framework. In Vienna the socialist countries did not allow the West to put them in the position of "defendants" in the sphere of human rights and humanitarian issues. They were equal partners in the talks, and in many cases they led the fight for genuine human rights.

As a result, the agreements in this sphere in the concluding document represent qualitative and quantitative advances in comparison with the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid concluding document. For example, an important and conceptually new element among the results of this meeting is the agreement on something like confidence-building measures in the humanitarian sphere—on the creation of a monitoring mechanism for the exchange of information, opinions, and even complaints against one another by participating states in connection with the actual steps taken to fulfill obligations.

The approach to international relations from the standpoint of the human dimension (this is how the matter is worded in the concluding document) is becoming the only possible, realistic, and truly workable principle of international politics and is acquiring what could be called a strategic nature. The implementation of the Vienna mandates on the three-stage conference on the human dimension of the all-European process in Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow, the information forum in London, and the symposium on cultural heritage in Krakow should serve the cause of humanizing international relations and "collaboration" in the humanitarian sphere. These steps attest to the disappearance of "cold war" stereotypes and a move from confrontation to mutual understanding and interaction by representatives of different outlooks.

The results of the forum are important for the present and the future. The resulting consensus is an indication of the qualitatively new status of Europe. The concluding document of the Vienna meeting, as M.S. Gorbachev

said, "is an unprecedented event in terms of content, in terms of goals, and in terms of the probable variety of positive consequences in Europe and the rest of the world."

Prospects for Conventional Forces Talks

*18070520 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 6, 3-9 Feb 89 p 1*

[Editorial: "Europe and Disarmament"]

[Text] The mandate for talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, which were agreed upon at the Vienna meeting by representatives of the states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, envisaged the commencement of the talks in March by 23 states: 16 NATO countries and 7 Warsaw Pact states. The purpose of the talks is "the reinforcement of stability and security in Europe by establishing a stable and safe balance of conventional armed forces, including conventional weapons and equipment, at lower levels." The talks are to eliminate "imbalances" and "the potential for surprise attacks and for the start of large-scale offensive actions." All of the land belonging to the participants in the talks in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was defined as the site of application.

In this way, the first step toward disarmament—the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles—is being followed by preparations for a second step, a multilateral step in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces, which should clear all of the powder kegs out of the "basement" of our "common European home" so that people will not have to sit on them any longer.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have insisted on this for a long time. The 15 January 1986 statement setting forth the plan for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, for example, also envisaged conventional force reductions. A comprehensive program in this area, presupposing the elimination of imbalances and inequalities on both sides as a start, was hammered out at the conferences of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Commission in Budapest in 1986, in Berlin in 1987, and in Warsaw in 1988. It was on this basis that the socialist countries held consultations on the nature of the mandate for the upcoming talks by the 23 states, displaying not only a desire for real force reductions but also a flexible approach to the matter.

The measures taken by the Warsaw Pact states for the unilateral reduction of their armed forces, equipment, defense budgets, and military production volumes served as new and tangible evidence of their intention to lower the level of military confrontation between the blocs and secure stability in line with the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defense. These measures, which are completely consistent with the spirit and letter of the concluding document approved in Vienna, are of tremendous political significance because they will aid in

creating a favorable climate on the eve of the talks by the 23 states and will deal another blow to the myth of the "military threat" supposedly posed by the East. They are also of serious military importance because the reductions are quite sizable and are being made by all seven socialist countries scheduled to take part in the talks. For the USSR this means a 12-percent reduction in armed forces personnel (240,000 of the half a million in the European half of the country) and the reduction of the military budget by 14.2 percent and of weapons and materiel production by 19.5 percent. The respective figures for other countries will be 12,000 and 15 percent for Czechoslovakia, 10,000 and 12 percent for Bulgaria, and 10,000 and 10 percent for the GDR. Poland will reduce the size of its army by 15,000 men and the proportion of the state budget used for military appropriations from 7.7 to 5.5 percent. Hungary will reduce the size of its army by 8.8 percent and its military output by 31 percent. Romania already reduced its military expenditures and army personnel by 5 percent in 1987. The process has begun quickly in all of these countries, without being related to the upcoming talks or their outcome. These measures are also important from the military standpoint because the reductions apply primarily to the types of arms in which the Warsaw Pact is superior. They are changing the structure of the groups of Soviet troops stationed in the socialist countries by envisaging the withdrawal of tank divisions, assault landing and ferrying units and combined units, and tactical weapons first. This is completely consistent with the Warsaw Pact's defensive doctrine.

The words a prominent Soviet academic addressed to NATO representatives are being quoted widely in the Western press in connection with the unilateral reductions: "We are planning to do something quite terrible to you. We are planning to deprive you of an enemy."

It is a fact that the North Atlantic bloc has justified its existence and the buildup of its military potential for the last 40 years with the existence of the Soviet military "menace." It turns out, however, that there is no threat of attack by the "Soviets" and that the Warsaw Pact countries are also making troop reductions without stipulating any conditions. As the WASHINGTON POST remarked after M.S. Gorbachev addressed the United Nations, "the reductions announced by the Soviets are large enough to be applauded and are certain to make an impression on the West Europeans." Now this impression has been reinforced. Nevertheless, although many statesmen (FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, for example) and several press organs appreciate the military and political "signals" coming from the East, the NATO leaders and the conservative press have taken a more complex stance. Although they acknowledge the significance of the Warsaw Pact measures and applaud them as a step in the right direction, they are also trying to obscure them with several standard arguments: They are saying that Warsaw Pact forces will still be superior, that it will be impossible for NATO to verify the reduction of military budgets and production volumes, and that the

Warsaw Pact countries are trying to win the propaganda battle for the minds of the West Europeans and thereby cause a rift in NATO. "Gorbachev's approach is dangerous," England's DAILY TELEGRAPH warned, "because its effect on Western public opinion could undermine Western security." People in London and Washington are not concealing the fact that they are gambling on the retention and modernization of short-range nuclear arms. It was no coincidence that English Foreign Secretary Howe visited Bonn expressly to "prove" to Genscher the "impermissibility of dissension in such key areas as the modernization of tactical nuclear arms" and convince him that NATO "must not lay down its arms." With a view to the upcoming elections, the mood of the public, and the demands of opposition parties for a constructive response to the East's peace initiatives, the Government of the FRG is trying at least to postpone the decision. This is apparently why new U.S. Secretary of Defense Tower mentioned the "vital need" for modernization again when he addressed a conference of the Werkunde martial sciences society in Munich and made frightening references to the Soviet "menace" in an attempt to urge the West European bloc allies to increase their military spending.

People in Washington and the headquarters of the North Atlantic alliance are reinforcing their demands with distortions of the actual balance of power between the two blocs. But after all, the Warsaw Pact and NATO have approximately equal military potential, and this gives no one any reason to hope for decisive military superiority. There are specific areas, however, in which either the East or the West is superior, and this is discussed in great detail and in precise terms in the statement by the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers. In fact, whereas the Warsaw Pact is superior in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, NATO is superior in assault aircraft, helicopters, ships with cruise missiles....

This statement was published in response to the refusal of the Atlantic alliance's leaders to conduct an official exchange of numerical data at a time when they are supplying the Western press with tendentious statistics. We must stipulate that the published statement of the Committee of Defense Ministers should not be regarded as a substitute for the official compilation of numerical personnel and materiel data when the talks begin. It is important as a point of departure, but the main thing, as E.A. Shevardnadze remarked in his speech in Vienna, is the "final level of weapons on hand, which should be taken to the lowest possible, mutually acceptable point."

"The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance in Europe should be sufficient for the reliable defense of each alliance, but neither alliance should have the means for a surprise attack on the other side or for offensive operations in general," the statement of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers says. "This should be the goal of the participants in the upcoming talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe."

'Illogic' of Increased British SSN Patrols in Barents Sea Deplored

18010426b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Mar 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by E. Babenko, political correspondent: "The Logic of 'Everything the Wrong Way Around'"]

[Text] We have a London PRESS ASSOCIATION news agency dispatch in front of us: "As it turns out, British Navy nuclear-powered submarines are increasing the number of patrol cruises in the strategically important Barents Sea area near the Soviet Union."

Those who gave this information to the Press Agency explain this increase by a "sharp decrease" in the number of Soviet patrol submarines sailing outside their territorial waters. The press agency cites the opinion of one well-known Western strategist: "If they do not come to us, then we will have to go to them."

We have not begun to confirm if this "patrol reduction" of our submarines is true or not. In our view, the main thing here is something else: the logic or, more precisely, the lack of logic in the information stated by the authors.

Let us provide official information from the Soviet side. For the purpose of lowering the level of military confrontation between the blocs and for insuring stability in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, states, which are part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO], are presently taking steps to unilaterally reduce armed forces and equipment, defense budgets, and the output of military manufacturing. This process is beginning in all Warsaw Treaty countries immediately, is not tied to forthcoming talks, and is not dependent on their outcome. For the USSR, this means a 12 percent numerical reduction in the armed forces, including 240,000 men in the European portion.

Let us apply the logic of Western strategists stated above to all of this: "Since the Russians are moving away from us, we will close in on them." In this case, hundreds of thousands of NATO officers and men and their corresponding equipment must additionally appear on the territory of the Western states contiguous to the European countries of the socialist community in answer to the East's unilateral disarmament measures?!

For almost 40 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has justified its existence and the constant build-up of military potential by the presence of a "military peril from the East." How do they suddenly explain that the "Red threat" not only does not exist, but moreover, the Warsaw Treaty, without any conditions, is voluntarily and unilaterally reducing its armed forces and equipment.

The really feasible peace-loving initiatives of the WTO countries are having a positive effect on Western public opinion. The notorious "enemy image" is being eroded.

It appears from a recent poll of the FRG population that the West Germans place the issue of defense from an external threat as 17th, that is, in last place among the issues listed by the poll's organizers. In other words, they no longer believe that a "communist attack" is on the verge of being unleashed.

We are not extreme optimists and we will not succumb to the euphoria from practical steps already taken toward the beneficial and necessary process of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe for both sides. But we are justified in counting on answering steps. All the more so since the logic of "everything the wrong way around" under the conditions created today are hardly capable of bringing success to its proponents.

First Soviet Tanks Prepare to Leave Hungary

18010643 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Apr 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Lt Col A. Borovkov, Southern Group of Forces, entitled: "On the Road Home".]

[Text] Today a major event has come to this small, unprepossessing city—to Kishkunkhalashe [transliteration]—in the south of Hungary. Here the first Soviet tanks from among those being withdrawn from the Hungarian People's Republic are being loaded onto rail-road flatcars. The withdrawal is to take place in two stages.

The first [stage] has begun. Approximately 150 pieces of artillery sent from different garrisons of the SGF equipment have already been loaded onto flatcars. Now it is the tanks' turn. The first ones being moved onto flatcars are combat vehicles of the tank battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Zaytsev. The heavy equipment is securely fastened onto the flatcars. They await the return home.

The announced withdrawal of units of Soviet troops from the territory of fraternal Hungary has begun. It is being carried out in an organized fashion and within the established time.

SS-12, SS-23 Missiles Turned Into Museum Exhibits in Leningrad

LD2604055589 Moscow TASS in English 0547 GMT
26 Apr 89

[Text] Leningrad April 26 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Chumakov:

Launchers and shorter-range missiles, which are to be eliminated under the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty, went on show for the first time at the Leningrad military-historical Museum of Artillery, Engineer and Communications Troops. The missiles that were delivered to the banks of the River Neva include OTR-22 and OTR-23, which are known in the West as SS-12 and SS-23.

They were brought from Saryozek, Kazakhstan, the site of missile destruction. Tractors drove to Leningrad on their own from the Belorussian settlement of Stankovo, where they are being converted for civilian use.

All equipment that was turned over to the museum was inspected by American specialists, said Major Aleksandr Shtyrov, a senior officer at the centre for the elimination of shorter-range missiles.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner Says Agreement Possible on Missiles

LD2604180189 Hamburg DPA in German
1624 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] Hannover (DPA)—In the opinion of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, agreement is possible on the issue of modernizing short-range nuclear missiles by the NATO summit at the end of May in Brussels. "There have been many differences of opinion in NATO before, ahead of important decisions," Woerner said this evening in Hannover. He is giving a speech to the German-Atlantic Society in the capital of Lower Saxony on the occasion of NATO's 40th anniversary.

The emphasis of disarmament negotiations must remain in the conventional area, the secretary general said: "The real potential threat to Europe lies here." Asked about the inflexible British and U.S. attitude, Woerner earlier told the press: "Every member state of NATO has the right to express its opinion. The Federal Government's position is one about which one can talk." It is his task as secretary general "to come to an agreement from such a position". At the moment it is above all important to negotiate behind the scenes in order to come to a joint attitude on the issue of modernization.

DENMARK

Danish Foreign Minister Backs FRG Position on SNF

LD2604125889 Hamburg DPA in German
1206 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] Copenhagen (DPA)—In the NATO dispute over the modernization of U.S. Lance short-range missiles, Denmark and Norway support Bonn's position. Danish Foreign Affairs Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen stated this today in Copenhagen during a joint news conference with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Ellemann-Jensen, who met Genscher on the sidelines of the state visit by Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker, said: "The proposals of the Federal Government have our full support."

The Danish foreign minister stated further that he had established a "to a high degree parallel position" in a telephone conversation with his Norwegian counterpart Thorvald Stoltenberg, also conducted today.

Ellemann-Jensen stated that according to his government there should be no decision taken over the modernization desired by the United States before the 1990's. He said further: "Here, Bonn's date of 1992 is a good proposal." On the question of negotiations as quickly as possible on the reduction of short-range missiles he also supported the Federal Government's position.

According to information from Bonn delegation circles, the NATO dispute over the Lance missiles also played a considerable part in a political meeting between Weizsaecker and Danish Premier Poul Schluter, which the two foreign ministers also attended. The federal president is in Copenhagen on a 3-day state visit to Denmark.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Foreign, Defense Ministers Discuss SNF Issues in Washington

Press Briefed

AU2504115489 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 25 Apr 89

[Text] Despite the negative attitude of the United States and Great Britain, the Federal Government intends to adhere to the demand to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on a reduction in short-range nuclear missiles. After their return from talks in Washington, Federal Foreign Minister Genscher, Free Democratic Party, and Defense Minister Stoltenberg, Christian Democratic Union, stressed at a news conference in Bonn today that nothing has changed about the German position. They added that Chancellor Kohl will expound this position, which was decided upon by the coalition recently, in his government statement on Thursday [27 April]. Both politicians expressed confidence that it will be possible to achieve agreement within the alliance on this issue. Genscher said that the talks in Washington were useful, successful, and encouraging.

Ministers Say Trip 'Worthwhile'

LD2504114689 Hamburg DPA in German
1043 GMT 25 Apr 89

[Text] Bonn—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg have expressed optimism about a solution to the controversial issue of short-range missiles. After their return from the United States, both ministers told a news conference on Tuesday at midday that Bonn will "achieve a joint stance" with the U.S. allies and other NATO partners in the run-up to the NATO summit at the end of May.

Genscher stressed that the visit to the U.S. capital was not only a necessary "but also a useful one, and from our point of view a successful and encouraging one in relation to the issues." Stoltenberg said: "The trip was worthwhile." The positions "on both sides" had "been considerably better understood than was previously the case." The foreign minister gave no details of the talks in Washington. They want no harm done by excessive public discussion. The FRG Government will remain in dialogue with the United States.

Genscher made it clear that in his talks with leading politicians in Washington he, together with Stoltenberg, had been able to cite decisions by the Western alliance in

Reykjavik and Brussels on the issue of future negotiations about short-range nuclear missiles. At that time negotiations had already been under consideration. The view that it is only in 1992 that a decision has to be made on the successor to the Lance missile is "well-founded."

Genscher strongly emphasized the fact that the FRG has a "significant say" on short-range missiles. This was recognized by the United States. The two sides in Washington have agreed that the goal must now remain "to work with a will to succeed toward the achievement of a joint position in the Western alliance at the Brussels summit." In this spirit both sides have come to understand each other better.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg Comments

AU2504134589 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 25 Apr 89

[Telephone interview with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by moderator Dietmar Boettcher in Bonn on 25 April—recorded]

[Text] [Boettcher] Mr Stoltenberg, you have been in office for 4 days and have just concluded your first difficult mission in Washington. We reported briefly on the news conference that you gave together with Foreign Minister Genscher. You said that you are optimistic that a certain understanding will be reached with Washington and within NATO on how to handle the issue of short-range nuclear missiles regarding modernization and negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on a possible further reduction. What are the reasons for your optimism?

[Stoltenberg] These are two separate themes in a much wider framework. The objective of the NATO summit meeting in a few weeks is, first, to make clear in a political statement the alliance's foreign policy ideas in a changing world, in particular, in the context of changing East-West relations, and in so doing, to guarantee the bases of security, the bases of the tasks of the alliance and its forces, to guarantee peace and freedom. The second objective is a concept of arms control and disarmament, which has been discussed and prepared for several months now. In view of this summit meeting as well as in view of the government statement that the chancellor will deliver the day after tomorrow [27 April], we, the coalition and the government, formulated a position last week, following long preparatory talks. We intend to bring this position into the alliance talks, with the aim being, of course, to arrive at a common statement within the alliance.

It is correct that among other problems, the two issues you mentioned do play a role. We have stated that while we agree on important issues, we must continue our talks on other issues. However, contrary to many pessimistic commentaries that were published prior to our Washington talks, certain prospects have presented themselves

regarding the question as to how agreement can be achieved in further talks. These talks will be continued not only with the Americans but also with the other allies.

[Boettcher] Mr Stoltenberg, the pessimism that you just addressed is of course also a result of the fact that the positions, in particular in Bonn and Washington, seem to be diametrically opposed. The FRG wants to hold negotiations soon on a reduction in short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery, because in the case of war, the FRG, Germany, central Europe would be hardest hit by such weapons systems, and the Federal Government wants to suspend, until after 1992 at least, a decision on a modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear systems. The United States wants just the opposite. It wants to modernize now, if possible, and not negotiate, if possible. How does that square?

[Stoltenberg] Prior to our meeting, there were detailed press reports that there are opportunities to hold talks with the United States on the time at which the decision on production and thus deployment will be made. We have explored that, and there will be further contacts on this problem. As for the negotiations, I want to begin with an important point of agreement. As you know, the conventional disarmament talks with the Warsaw Pact were resumed in Vienna. That is of high priority for us all. The Warsaw Pact, in particular, the Soviet Union, are highly superior in these weapons in central Europe. Owing to our geographical situation, that affects us in particular. We are in agreement that it is our objective to reduce this overwhelming superiority and to arrive at a balanced system and, in particular, to bring about a situation in which there is no longer a capacity to attack.

If concrete negotiations can be held in the final phase, the Western alliance will certainly also be ready to carry out reductions in the conventional area to an acceptable extent. However, the Warsaw Pact's massive superiority is connected with much higher expectations on our part, so that a defensive nature of the military situation in Europe will be achieved.

Now, there is the additional issue of also bringing in the problem of a reduction in short-range missiles. We said that we want the matter to be resolved soon, while the Americans consider it necessary to discuss this. We will discuss the conditions. But our talks in Washington were useful, even though we cannot announce a result.

[Boettcher] Can NATO conceive of a linkage—the beginning of negotiations on short-range missiles, if initial successes are achieved in Vienna in the conventional arms talks?

[Stoltenberg] We have not yet reached that point. We both made it clear that we must continue our contacts with Washington. Because we do not hold bilateral discussions, we now must include the other partners in our new considerations. The federal chancellor will meet

with the British Prime Minister before long, and he will also meet with the Italian Prime Minister. The foreign minister will go to Paris in a few days. We will consult all our allies within a short time, because it is indeed our goal to arrive at a common definition of our position prior to the summit. We only have a few weeks time.

Press Views

AU2504111589 Cologne DEUTSCHLANDFUNK
NETWORK in German 0505 GMT 25 Apr 89

[From the press review]

[Text] Concerning Foreign Minister Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg's talks on the modernization of nuclear short-range missiles in Washington, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG writes: The alliance is asking itself whether this is the great NATO crisis—provoked by a center-right FRG Government, of all partners? The dim outlines of a controversy within the alliance could be spotted several weeks ago. The United States, Britain, and—quietly—France had established the position: Negotiations with the Russians—not now. First the Vienna talks would have to level off all those imbalances that were favoring the Warsaw Pact in the spheres of troops, tanks, and cannons. This was opposed by Genscher's demand for parallel, that is to say simultaneous, negotiations. Since last weekend this position—with certain reservations—has also become that of the coalition, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes.

WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG from Duesseldorf states: When Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gerhard Stoltenberg left for Washington it was already clear: This lightning visit was made on the demand of the citizens of our country. It is the result of the chancellor's and the coalition's panic that they might lose further voter support, a fear that is not unjustified. All opinion polls indicate that the citizens in the part of the world with the highest concentration of weapons are now expecting accelerated disarmament. If, instead, a new phase of armament is forced upon them, the voters will lose their patience, WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes.

SUEDWEST-PRESSE, which is published in Ulm, has the following opinion: Bonn wants to prevent an early decision regarding the deployment of nuclear short-range missiles. This does by no means signify that the United States would have to clear certain negotiating positions vis-a-vis Moscow. The possibility of modernizing the missiles and their subsequent deployment alone are a significant argument in any negotiations. The question remains to what extent the United States and Great Britain believe that the next generation of missiles has to be placed on the table as a trump card, as was practiced successfully with the Pershing II, for example. This was the view of SUEDWEST-PRESSE.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG points to the connection with the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament and asks: Should one stop pressing for these talks considering that one has not achieved the slightest result? This would be a fatal mistake. Genscher's position can hardly be explained in terms of security policy, and the FRG Government is walking a thin line. In this tricky situation the alliance's goal has to be to find a middle course between a policy that is based on short-term considerations and one that is based on principles.

Different to NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG is the judgment of SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE from Oberndorf: Genscher certainly acts in the interest of NATO when he makes sure that the alliance's policy has to remain acceptable for FRG citizens. Besides, Bonn is not the only partner within the alliance who wants to enter into early negotiations with Moscow on reducing nuclear short-range missiles to equal ceilings, as certain circles in Washington are trying to suggest. Even by indirect threats to withdraw parts of the U.S. troops from Europe, the FRG Government should continue to stand firm. It can only be to the government's advantage even in domestic policy, SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE concludes.

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, which is published in Mainz, is convinced that NATO will not break up because of this internal row. Bonn's demands are certainly realistic. However, warnings that the West's lack of firmness is now only strengthening Gorbachev's opponents in Moscow, are as little helpful as are hidden U.S. hints at the latent isolationism of the United States and its possible influence on the continued presence of U.S. troops on the "old" continent. Europe and the United States continue to depend on one another even—or particularly—in the epoch of disarmament and the irritations in terms of security policy caused by this transition. This was the view of MAINZER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG.

Bundestag Debate on SNF Modernization Question

Kohl Delivers Government Statement

AU2704073589 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 0703 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Government statement delivered by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Bundestag in Bonn on 27 April—live]

[Excerpts] Last week I reshuffled the FRG Cabinet. We made important factual decisions, and with this government statement I will explain our work program until the Bundestag elections of 1990 and our prospects for the 1990's. [passage omitted]

We, in the FRG Government and in the coalition, are well aware of the fact that many challenges of domestic and social policy can only be met through international

cooperation. This experience is not only reflected in the policies of Western governments but increasingly so in the policy of the Warsaw Pact states. In his 4 years of office, General Secretary Gorbachev has initiated a comprehensive reform policy, which by now has affected most spheres of the state, party, and society, and also foreign and security policy. If the reforms are to be successful, the USSR has to open up. This requires international cooperation, the political settlement of conflicts, and the reduction of heavy burdens that result from the arms race, military interventions, and ideological struggle. I know, and I would like to stress this, that some of the things I have just mentioned, have so far only been announced, some other things have only just been initiated, and many things have not been completed yet. However, USSR policy has shown more readiness to compromise and become more open for dialogue and cooperation. I still believe that we have every reason to start out from facts and not deeds. [applause]

Yet from what we have seen there are new opportunities and prospects for the future shaping of West-East relations. The FRG Government is firmly determined to use this opportunity, an opportunity that is leading to better understanding and cooperation, and thus stabilizes peace in Europe and guarantees security. [passage omitted]

Who of us has not been shocked by the latest pictures from Georgia, from Armenia, and Azerbaijan. They prove that the current Soviet leadership, too, uses tanks and soldiers in order to settle conflicts in the country. Therefore, who can exclude setbacks on the path we are facing?

As long as superior military potentials in the Warsaw Pact and security policy risks continue to exist, we in the West, and in particular in Europe, cannot unilaterally reduce our own capability and readiness for defense or even neglect it. [applause]

Dialogue and cooperation with the East on the basis of secure defense capability will have to continue to be the common strategy of the Western alliance. We will also not permit, ladies and gentlemen, a contradiction to be construed between secure defense capability and progress in disarmament and arms control in order to amputate this double approach of our security policy in one way or another.

In this spirit, the alliance will again affirm its joint policy at the forthcoming NATO summit in Brussels on 30 May. In this we will let ourselves be guided by the experience gained over 4 decades of postwar history that the close and trusting partnership with our three Western allies, above all, with the United States, with France, and with Great Britain, was, is and remains of vital importance for the FRG. [applause]

We have formulated our position for the discussions in the alliance and for the talks prior to the decisions:

First, the FRG Government expresses its support for the statement of the alliance that there is no alternative—at least no foreseeable one—to the concept of preventing war through deterrence on the basis of a suitable composition of appropriate and effective nuclear and conventional armed forces. Under the circumstances, ground-based, sea-based, and air-based systems of nuclear forces are also necessary in Europe.

Second, the development of a follow-up system for the Lance short-range missile is a national decision of the United States.

Third, within the framework of the overall concept for arms control and disarmament, the alliance gives the assignment for the early start of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles with the goal of equal low-level ceilings that was formulated by the alliance in Reykjavik in 1987 and in Brussels in 1988.

Fourth, for nuclear artillery ammunition, too, an assignment for negotiations with the goal of equal ceilings at a drastically reduced level is included in the overall concept.

Fifth, in 1992 the alliance will decide—in the light of political and security-policy developments, in particular taking into consideration the results of the disarmament negotiations—whether in 1996 the introduction into the alliance of a Lance follow-up system and thus production and deployment are necessary or not. For this, ladies and gentlemen—and I want to stress this now—it is decisive whether it will be possible to create greater security at a lower level of nuclear and conventional armed forces as a whole, to conclude binding agreements with the Warsaw Pact on eliminating the capability for surprise attacks and for large-scale attacks, and to create with corresponding agreements a higher degree of mutual trust on the basis of increased transparency and predictability of military behavior.

This position was explained by the FRG foreign minister and defense minister to our partners in Washington at the beginning of this week. We decided to continue intensive talks with our U.S. friends until the summit. We are also conducting talks with all the other partners. I will be holding talks with Prime Minister Thatcher on Sunday [30 April], with the Italian Prime Minister De Mita on Tuesday [2 May], and with my Netherlands counterpart on Wednesday [3 May].

Ladies and gentlemen, I understand your cheerfulness. It will be a great pleasure for me to welcome Margaret Thatcher in the FRG. [word indistinct]

We are firmly resolved to reach agreement on all defense policy issues and on all disarmament and arms control issues at the NATO summit. We have an elementary

interest in ensuring the cohesion and the functioning of the Atlantic alliance in the future. This has always been our policy, and this will remain so in the future.

Ladies and gentlemen, in 1983 this coalition, this government, proved more than any other NATO member how much importance we attach to a secure and stable NATO. We do not need any private lessons concerning our readiness to support the NATO community. [applause]

Our alliance has repeatedly furnished evidence of its readiness for disarmament. A total of 2,400 nuclear warheads have been unilaterally dismantled in Europe by NATO over the past few years. The FRG Government decided to do without the 72 Pershing 1A missiles. President Bush has announced the early and unilateral removal of all chemical weapons from the FRG. What we hope now is that the Soviet Union will finally take corresponding measures, that it will drastically reduce its 14-fold superiority in the sphere of short-range nuclear missiles, particularly because it has well over 10,000 warheads in the strategic nuclear field. [applause, passage indistinct]

The FRG Government—I would like to mention once more what some of you seem to have forgotten—called for talks on short-range nuclear systems within the framework of the INF negotiations, with the aim of eliminating the existing disparities through drastic reductions, and of agreeing on common ceilings. I repeatedly demanded this in letters to then President Reagan from 1986 on. Our position can also be seen from the NATO communique issued in Reykjavik on 12 July 1987, and from the Brussels communique dated March 1988.

Ladies and gentlemen, everybody must and will understand that it is clear that the FRG Government—and the FRG Bundestag—have adopted this position. Because of the range of the short-range systems, the FRG is more affected than any other partner in the alliance. For this reason, it is clear to me that our partners should show the same understanding for our interests as we have quite naturally shown for our partners on many occasions. [applause]

The success of our disarmament efforts will depend on whether we will be able to jointly ensure our security within the alliance in a plausible manner. This task of safeguarding peace has been assigned to our Bundeswehr.

Because of the the small number of conscripts expected in the near future, the Bundestag, at the proposal of the government, decided in April 1986 to extend military service from 15 to 18 months as of July 1989. In order to ensure justice in the field of defense, we also reorganized the physical examinations and reduced draft obstacles. We know now that a considerably larger number of

young men can be drafted, and in view of this development and in order to ensure more justice, it is useful to postpone the decision to prolong military service, which was to have taken effect on 1 July 1989, to 1992. [applause] [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Genscher Speaks

AU2704130089 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 1010 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Speech by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Bundestag session in Bonn on 27 April—live]

[Text] [Passage indistinct] My dear colleague, our colleague Mrs Vollmer [deputy for Greens], whom you have just mentioned, has shown understanding for the fact that I am going to speak now, but she will be able to speak before the lunch recess.

Ladies and gentlemen, before I am going to express my views on important foreign policy issues, I would like to express my thanks [word indistinct]—not for your interjection, my dear colleague—for the support granted by Colleague Vogel to the university policy of my friend Joachim Moellemann [minister of education and science]. I proceed from the premise that now all laender with a social democratic government will support this policy. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, our discussion is taking place at a time when Europe has started to undergo some movement. It becomes obvious that even though Europe is divided it is indivisible. The categorical imperative of the European democracies is first, to continue with determination the process of unification within the EC; second, to overcome the division of Europe through cooperation, through implementing human rights, and through disarmament by means of agreements, and through confidence-building; and third, never to forget that these things are only possible on the basis of secure defense capability in a Western alliance that is able to act.

Ladies and gentlemen, a European peace order in which borders lose their separating function, in which the people live without fearing each other, in which they can make decisions about their own state and social system—such a peace order is no longer just a vision, the chances of its becoming reality have increased. It is necessary to expand and strengthen the cooperative elements of coexistence. The change of the tide in Europe's international policy cannot be stopped or overlooked.

Ladies and gentlemen, nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come. It is the idea of removing the concept of enemies from international relations. [applause] It is the idea of demilitarizing West-East relations. [applause] It is the idea of de-ideologizing

West-East relations. It is the idea of dialogue and cooperation, the idea of erecting new structures of peace. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the topics that must be discussed at the forthcoming summit of the Western alliance. [applause]

The basic question for the West is whether it fears a danger inherent in the democratization and reform of the socialist states or sees a chance and is willing to use this chance. [applause]

The answer can only be: It is a historic chance, we must not let it pass by without using it. It is our responsibility not to wait distantly and passively, but to exert creative influence.

The central element of the future structure—my dear colleague, if you would support NATO like I do, this would be great progress in your case. [applause] A central element of Europe's future structure is the EC. It provides an example of having already implemented part of the European peace order, with the core of German-French cooperation. Only with a dynamic EC can a new and lasting peace order develop all over Europe. Now the increasing attractive power, the attractiveness, the fascination emanating from our liberal, socially successful model are becoming obvious. We really have no reason for despondency and concern, but for confidence and activity. [applause] But only with a Western alliance that is able to act will we be able to use the new chances in the West-East relations.

Who wants to deny that the elections in the Soviet Union showed how strong the idea of democratization is rooted in the thoughts and desires of the people in the Soviet Union. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, this was not only a rejection of the opponents of reform in the Soviet Union, it also was a rejection of all those in the West who thought that perestroika is only a playground for intellectuals. [applause] No, ladies and gentlemen, everywhere in the world people want freedom, they are using the slightest possibilities of freedom. No one needs to learn freedom—this is the insight. [applause]

This reform process in the Soviet Union is an expression of European reason. Realistic prospects for a basically new shaping of relations between the states and a European peace order such as have been called for by the Harmel report of the alliance are emerging.

The treaty on the intermediate-range nuclear missiles has shown that disarmament is possible and verifiable, and that it increases security. The Vienna talks on conventional stability can be advanced by new efforts at the Geneva talks on a universal ban on chemical weapons. The time has come for it, and disarmament must not exclude any category of weapons. The title of the

overall concept, which is to be adopted in Brussels in May, is the concept for arms control and disarmament, and not the concept for arms. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, why should this concept ignore the demands that were made in negotiations in 1987 and 1988. I think that there are many things that we have to be afraid of in Europe and in the world. Yet we certainly do not have to be afraid of negotiations, or the USSR, which is ready to negotiate. [applause] Those who are in favor of disarmament have to negotiate disarmament. Disarmament cannot be achieved against the other side, but only in negotiations with the other side. A realistic disarmament policy requires that disarmament steps become irreversible by negotiations and treaties so that there can be no return to a new arms race. The FRG makes an important contribution to the common security of the West, and its most important contribution is that to conventional defense. The citizens of our country, and the soldiers of our Bundeswehr, who fulfill their peace and freedom service, have the right to expect from us that we use every single opportunity to increase security by disarmament. Our Western alliance's great objective is to prevent war. This is the goal of our common strategy. We support the alliance's view that in the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the concept of preventing war by deterrence on the basis of an appropriate combination of suitable and effective nuclear and conventional armed forces. Under the current circumstances, land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear systems are necessary even in Europe. However, we also know that the importance of nuclear weapons for the deterrence of war diminishes with the decreasing range of these weapons. [applause] It is an essential doctrine of our alliance that nuclear weapons serve the political objective of preventing war. Any other view would lead us to a war scenario that would mean the end of all of Europe. That is why it is necessary to create an additional cooperative security network, which makes it even more likely that we shall be able to prevent a conventional and nuclear war. We do not even want a so-called limited nuclear war. Even in this respect there must be no zones of different security, either in the alliance or in Europe. The central issue of the security problems in Europe is and remains the East's conventional superiority. Replacing this situation by conventional stability with fewer weapons, by abolishing the ability to launch a surprise strike, or a large-scale offensive—this is the objective of the Vienna talks. That is why it is right that the FRG Government attaches much importance to the question of whether or not it regards a follow-up system for the Lance short-range missile in the second half of the nineties as necessary.

What is decisive is that we come to agreements on this, that we reach the other goals that are mentioned in the government statement.

Today no one can predict in a sufficiently reliable way what the political and security-political situation will be like in 1992. Therefore, it is impossible to decide today

whether such a follow-up system has to be decided in 1992 for 1996 or not. With its army based on compulsory military service, the Bundeswehr, and with the acceptance of our security policy by the population, the FRG are making an indispensable contribution to the security of all alliance partners.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the basis for our claim of having an important say also in decisions of the alliance on defense and arms control and disarmament. [applause]

With mutual respect, our alliance (of free) democracies is able to reach understanding concerning all issues. We want this—it is not a weakness if democratic states are trying to find a common path by means of discussion.

The chancellor stressed that we do not have any backlog in proving our determination; that we will do what is necessary for our common security. In 1979 and in 1982 we made important decisions in this respect.

However, we also expect all partners to stand at our side if we want to eliminate the East's superiority in short-range missiles by means of negotiations. [applause] And we also expect understanding if we do not make the decision easy about whether the deployment of new short-range nuclear missiles is necessary or not. Nowhere is the East's superiority as large as concerning short-range missiles. Therefore, it is in the elementary security interest of the West to eliminate this superiority at the negotiating table through achieving equal ceilings, as was already demanded in Reykjavik.

The FRG shares all—and I stress all—risks of the current security situation with the other alliance partners. However, the threat by the Soviet short-range missiles particularly affects us. Most other partners are not within their reach.

Ladies and gentlemen, therefore the wish to eliminate the Soviet superiority in these missiles is not only understandable; it also corresponds to the basic philosophy of our alliance to create more stability by eliminating superiority.

On our side the decision on new short-range nuclear missiles involves weapons systems that can reach the Polish and the Czech people, who had to suffer such enormous misery during World War II. It involves short-range nuclear systems that can reach the other part of our fatherland. Thus, when we are called upon to decide this, we will not forget this—and I say this here as my very personal responsibility, the members of the FRG Government take the vow to dedicate their strength to the welfare of the German people. The obligation arising from this vow does not end at the border that cuts right through Germany. [applause]

The national responsibility based on this does not exclude my home region, the town in which I was born, and does not exclude the people who live in the GDR, no, this responsibility includes these people. [applause]

How serious we are about the German nation is not demonstrated by the way we behave on Sundays [Sonntagsfrieden], it is demonstrated by our daily efforts to strengthen peace, stability, and human rights in Europe, while striving for cooperation and disarmament. The peace mandate of our Basic Law applies to all European peoples. We have shown that we will resolutely do what is necessary to preserve freedom and security. However, with the same determination, we will make use of every available opportunity for cooperation, detente, and disarmament.

I appeal to our American friends, to whom we owe so much, whose Berlin airlift remains unforgotten, and whose contribution to European security is beyond question; I appeal to our American friends: They need not be worried about a new thoughtfulness on our part. They would only have to be afraid of a new lack of concern.

Ladies and gentlemen, [applause] doubts and thoughtfulness regarding the decision on new nuclear weapons are an expression of responsibility and anything but a sign of weakness. And this should not be criticized as such. The citizens of our country and all of us who are politically responsible [sentence as heard]. We Germans—and we say this to all our friends—are not striving for a future on our own. With the decision in favor of democracy, in favor of the Western alliance and the EC, we irrevocably made clear where we stand. We know exactly that an attempt to break away from this community, an attempt to detach the German fate from its European context and to de-Europeanize it, would contradict the European peace mandate of our constitution. It would isolate us in the East and the West. With our membership in the alliance of Western democracies, we have responsibly used the freedom we regained on 8 May 1945. In this way, we made the greatest commitment of which a state is capable, the commitment to fundamental values. However, ladies and gentlemen, we Germans also have neighbors who do not belong to this community of Western democracies and yet suffered terribly in World War II, neighbors who also want peace. We Germans are neither able nor willing to forget what happened to the Polish people, or the Soviet peoples' suffering and sacrifices. The sad experiences of this century cause these people to watch us attentively and watchfully. If it is true that East and West need a bridge of confidence, we Germans have to establish the main pillar of this bridge. The fact that we Germans feel especially responsible for confidence-building between East and West and that we act accordingly is neither arrogance nor presumption, but it is the deep insight of our historical task.

Ladies and gentlemen, there have been completely different objectives of German policy in this century than striving for good-neighborly relations with all Europeans. Today, after two murderous world wars, after

decades of confrontation between East and West, Europe has the historic chance of establishing a permanent, pan-European state of peace. We, as Germans, have a special task here. The French diplomat and poet (Paul Fridell) wrote in 1945 that Germany is not there to divide the people but to make all the different nations surrounding it understand that they cannot live without each other. We will meet this commitment to peace. [applause]

Genscher Speech Again

AU2804104989 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 0905 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Speech by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 28 April—live]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to express pleasure at the fact that this is the first opportunity for me to appear together with Minister Stoltenberg in his new capacity. He is not only a colleague but also a friend, to whom I wish every success for this difficult and responsible office within the government and the FRG.

Ladies and gentlemen, when discussing disarmament policy it is important to clearly define the starting position of this debate. This position is, first, characterized by the fact that the model of freedom, the model of the market economy, and the model of integration within the EC is becoming increasingly attractive and developing an appeal and a force of renewal in an increasing number of states in central and Eastern Europe.

Second, we can state that the underlying idea of the Harmel report, which was presented by the Western alliance in 1967, the idea that it is necessary to establish a state of peace, a European state of peace from the Atlantic to the Urals, that this basic idea is for the first time drawing a positive response from the East—in the form of an answer by Gorbachev—after decades of waiting.

Third, we can state that, with the exception of short-range missiles, all weapon spheres are the subject of disarmament talks. This concerns intercontinental strategic weapons, chemical weapons, and this year talks on conventional stability have also been opened, the goal of which has been formulated by the West. The talks do not only aim at achieving equal ceilings at a lower level, that is at creating more security with less military expenditure and at eliminating military superiority but also at eliminating the capability to attack, the capability to carry out surprise attacks, and the capability to carry out invasions.

Therefore, we are in a position to state that Western ideas are beginning to be accepted in the political and economic field and in the spheres of future-oriented European policies and disarmament. Thus, there is no reason for the West to be despondent, there is no reason

for the West to be concerned, provided that it is serious about its proposals, but it has every reason be confident and to persistently pursue the goals that it has formulated. It is indeed necessary to make courageous and resolute use of the new openness that results from the new Soviet policy. This is the task we are facing, and we must add this missing link to the chain of disarmament, we must add the part to the disarmament process that is linked with the short-range missiles. We can state that we are meeting with increasing understanding for this position within the entire alliance, and with increasing understanding for the negotiations among our European partners, particularly among those who feel particularly affected, in same way as we do. Colleague Lamers is right. What is important now is to achieve a consensus within the alliance because only a united alliance—we have had this experience in the past—can achieve progress in the sphere of disarmament, and only a united alliance will be able to do this in the future. Mrs colleague [Angelika Beer from the Greens], consensus does not concern the arms race because the proposal to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, which has ultimately been realized, has not been submitted by the East but by the West.

I have often warned against adhering to hostile images, and have called on everybody to find out for themselves what the real intentions of the other side are. Mrs colleague, I was mainly speaking about hostile images in the sphere of foreign policy. However, when I heard you speak here today, I got the impression that your problem is not so much foreign-policy hostile images but domestic-policy hostile images, which you find difficult to abandon. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, besides disarmament and the development in disarmament policy, we are witnessing a political development in Europe that creates the required preconditions for the successfully shaping of disarmament talks. It has repeatedly been pointed out by all parties represented in Parliament that we must not reduce East-West relations, and that we must continue to accord significance to questions of arms control and disarmament because they are vital for the survival of our continent.

However, we are also responsible for creating the required political preconditions which make possible the building of confidence; this confidence should in turn lead to results in disarmament talks. Confidence-building measures are more than verification agreements. Confidence-building measures include the creation of common interests, the creation of common tasks on the basis of common goals, which cannot be abandoned by anyone without endangering himself, without creating disadvantages for himself.

For this reason, the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting was such an important precondition for an agreement to start talks on conventional stability. If we had not narrowed our differences on the

issue of political cooperation, if we had not been able to make it possible to achieve clear progress on the human rights issue, it would not have been possible for us to agree on a mandate for conventional disarmament. Both aspects are indivisibly linked. This is the great underlying idea of the CSCE process, which combines cooperation, human rights, and security—security which is also conceived as an integral part of every responsible security policy that is aimed at arms control and disarmament. This is a very special task that we can fulfill. German-Soviet relations are of central importance here. For this reason, the upcoming visit by General Secretary Gorbachev will be a significant contribution to improving East-West relations. German-Soviet relations are of central importance for East-West relations.

I think we are also aware that in 1989, 50 years after the beginning of World War II, which was triggered by Hitler's attack on Poland, it is important to open a new chapter, a future-oriented chapter, in German-Polish relations through the visit by the chancellor and the subsequent visit by the president. There is no point in talking too much about this subject. What is important is to make a German-Polish contribution to hope for all of Europe. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, if we recognize this historic and moral aspect of our policy, if we are convinced—and we are entitled to this—of the power of the idea of freedom, the power of the idea of our liberal social model, we will be able to settle the disarmament issues. In this connection, we support what was decided at the start of the this government's cooperation, what was stipulated in the chancellor's government statement—to create peace with fewer weapons. We will make our contribution to this disarmament policy. We bear a special responsibility that coincides with the special interests of the Germans. We bear special responsibility for peace in Europe, and we are particularly interested in overcoming the division of Europe, because everything that separates Europe, also divides Germans from Germans.

Ladies and gentlemen, for this reason, it is to the advantage of the FRG's policy if it understands itself as a driving force in the spheres of detente, cooperation, and disarmament. I think that every European and each of our partners and friends overseas should realize that these are the motives of our actions. If this is the case, misunderstandings are not possible. Thank you very much.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg Speaks

*AU2804110789 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 0956 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Speech by Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 28 April—live]

[Text] Mr President, ladies and gentlemen: It is not very convincing, Colleague Voigt, when you present yourself here as a concerned advocate of trusting relations with

the United States and criticize us. I do not have to explain this extensively for the third time: The talks which Colleague Genscher and I had with our American colleagues were frank but clearly characterized by the will to determine and coordinate our positions where necessary in the spirit of (?firm) partnership. We are holding these talks on the basis of a common strategy of the alliance. The Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] has far removed itself from this common issue, and, therefore, you are in no position to criticize and reproach us here in this way. [applause]

Colleague Count Huyn, for assessing the position of the FRG Government and the coalition, Egon Bahr is not a very good witness of the prosecution. The fear—which you suggested in the form of a quote—that this FRG Government might accept a loosening of its ties to the West, is entirely unjustified. The chancellor's government statement and the statements of the spokesmen of our groups of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Free Democratic Party stressed this yesterday.

Furthermore, yesterday and today—I would like to add this—one thing has become obvious: The East-West discussion is currently taking place with an intensity that was considered impossible a few years ago, particularly by the opposition. This is a success of our policy—I want to specially emphasize this.

The goal of these negotiations is to promote stability and security all over Europe at a lower level of armed forces. With its changed policy, the Soviet Union has opened up some positive prospects for this and has carried out a first, limited step with the troop reductions that have just started. However, even if this reduction is completed, the fact remains that in Europe there is a considerable superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Our security continues to rest on two pillars, none of which must be neglected: Our secure defense capability in the alliance, which we have to maintain also in the future, and the willingness for dialogue and arms control.

These are necessary elements of security policy which complement each other. The motion brought by the SPD, which is being discussed today, separates arms control and disarmament from security—certainly not without consideration or intent. This is the basic opposition, Colleague Voigt, which you and your party have now entered with respect to us and our allies. I was a bit surprised by your statement that with your concept you agree with all social democrats in Western Europe. One only has to note the public statements by France's socialist government in order to see that this is simply not true.

Demands for disarmament and arms control are widely supported today—with justification. However, some of the statements on this topic lack a sober analysis of the preconditions of security. This FRG Government has done everything in its power to push ahead the process of

arms control. The SPD motion intends to give the opposite impression. We say yes to our duty of actively participating in the consistent further development of our security policy in the alliance and to advocate Germany's standpoints. We have special geographic preconditions, but one thing is not stressed sufficiently, in my view, when the special threat to the Germans is discussed in connection with certain weapon systems: Here are more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers, here are numerous soldiers and relatives of the other NATO troops, and they bear the same risk as we Germans. This also belongs to the community of security. [applause]

Therefore, the justified definition of German interests in the alliance must not be brought into marked opposition to the legitimate interests of our allies, whose soldiers and relatives work for peace and freedom here in Germany together with our Bundeswehr.

The foundations of our security are at stake, the foundations for a constructive dialogue with the East, which primarily includes arms control and disarmament. We want the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces to be successful. The FRG Government has long worked for this. However, only a stable conventional defense in Europe establishes the preconditions for this. Therefore, we continue to need efficient conventional armed forces, and we need them at a scope that permits us to exercise defense successfully, as far as is humanly possible.

Ladies and gentlemen, the term structural incapability to attack, as it is normally used, easily blurs a basic fact: The NATO Armed Forces are incapable of waging a war of aggression and they will not be capable of doing so in the future, either. The Warsaw Pact still has much more extensive disarmament to undertake in order to lose its capability to attack.

It is one of the interesting effects of perestroika that today Soviet politicians and generals are talking more frankly about the fact that so far their armed forces have had to be assessed as offensive forces capable of attack. We hope that a new path is now being followed consistently. The Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence-building measures and security will be of very special importance in the near future. The proposals submitted by both sides show agreement or at least a start of agreement on some important issues. This justifies the hope of being able to achieve a negotiation result that increases security through more stability and trust. This is our goal.

East and West basically agree that first equal ceilings must be reached by eliminating superiority. However, one must not put too many other topics on the agenda of these negotiations, if one is interested in success concerning the central issue. I also say this referring to some points of Colleague Scheer's statements.

Ladies and gentlemen, yesterday it became entirely clear that the FRG Government wants negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. We are having intensive talks on this with our allies. All this was said in great detail yesterday. However, I would like to stress once again that, in the view of all alliance partners, at present there is no alternative to the [word indistinct] concept of deterrence of war through defense capability and graduated deterrence.

Those who want to advise us to restrict our military defense exclusively to conventional means in the future must know that with this they do not make peace more secure. Nuclear weapons only serve the political purpose of preventing war. Keeping them under control and reducing them in a certain way and in steps that have to be carefully determined, but in a way so that their peace-preserving function is basically maintained, is the task of the time we are facing.

Ladies and gentlemen, the differences between the government and the opposition have become clear here. [word indistinct] Yes, but I want to state expressly here, Colleague Voigt, that we are a liberal party and we also respect differing opinions of some colleagues. What we state here—I am speaking of the FRG Government, Colleague Genscher, and myself—is being supported by the coalition. This has become obvious today, and we can rely on this also in the future. [applause]

Finance Minister Waigel Speaks

*AU2804083989 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 1200 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Speech by Finance Minister Theo Waigel at the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 27 April—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] One word on what colleague Ehmke said before the lunch break. He called for immediate negotiations. Dear colleagues, this is possible only together with our alliance partners, and one can talk with the alliance partners and expect something of them only if one has not lost all political reputation as is the case with Ehmke, with you, Mr Vogel, and with the Social Democratic Party [SPD]. If you then think that you can win points with your new red-green alliance in this respect with the answers you gave in Berlin to the highest representative of our most important alliance partner, you must not be surprised that you are not being taken seriously there. Threats do not help in this connection. The only thing that helps is talks and trust.

Dear colleagues, in 1983 the SPD put the Bundestag election campaign and the domestic policy discussion about the implementation of the NATO double-track decision under the slogan: In the German interest. Today the former SPD candidate for the office of FRG chancellor calls for a third zero-option within the framework of East-West negotiations on disarmament and arms control without being able to predict the course of the disarmament talks at all.

This means putting on a straitjacket and making oneself dependent on the Soviet Union without knowing what will happen over the next years or over the next decade. The SPD—I am talking to you—fails to see the enormous superiority of the conventional armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. It underestimates the East's capability of invasion. It overlooks the peace-securing function of the strategy of deterrence. With this it is pursuing a policy that is diametrically opposed to Germany's security interests. The establishment of different zones—no matter whether in the conventional or the nuclear field—within NATO cannot be in the interest of Germany. The goal of the defense efforts of the Western alliance must be to create equal security for the citizens in Ottawa and Washington, in Rome and Bonn, in Copenhagen and in London.

No one can deny the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the field of conventional armed forces. The only guarantee of security in view of this superiority, the elimination of which is now being negotiated, is a minimum of nuclear deterrence. Those who request Western Europe to unilaterally renounce this guarantee of security—you, for instance—calls into question NATO's political basis for work. Those who today claim that counterarmament will never take place and do not know what will be done with 1,400 missiles on the other side are making an advance move without knowing how things will develop and act in an irresponsible way concerning our security policy. [applause]

Therefore, denuclearization of Europe is out of the question for us. It does not help us make progress, it does not safeguard peace. Since there is no promising alternative to the Harmel report, that is, the linking of credible deterrence and realistic policy of detente, it is in the interest of Germany if negotiations between East and West are held on the topic of short-range missiles with the goal of equal ceilings.

We also have to understand our alliance partners, because it has already been discussed and decided within NATO that these weapon systems are deployed only in central Europe and we are particularly affected and threatened by them [sentence as heard].

Concerning the specific question of the Lance follow-up system, this means that it must be the most important goal of the disarmament negotiations between East and West to eliminate the gross superiority of the East in the field of conventional armed forces.

On the basis of the results of the Vienna negotiations in particular, NATO will decide on the production and deployment of the Lance follow-up system in 1992. As in the case of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, it is exclusively the United State's business to make decisions on the development and testing of such a system, in the same way as the Soviet Union, too, has modernized its short-range weapons.

However, only on the basis of a corresponding, timely decision by the United States can the alliance decide on production and deployment in 1992.

Those who, like the opposition in the German Bundestag, are looking for the key only in the missile issue, miss the core of East-West problems. The key to these problems is to be found in the more profound ideological tensions as they are specifically expressed by the division of Germany. [passage omitted]

Colleague Vogel, one can always rely on the SPD and its Green coalition partners—but unfortunately only on its unreliability. In Washington Mr Vogel affirmed the SPD's agreement with the Western alliance, and in Bonn he is calling on the FRG Government to singlehandedly decide the issue of modernization. In Washington Mr Vogel demonstrated friendly relations with new U.S. President Bush, and in Berlin his future partners for a coalition in Bonn declare President Bush persona non grata. In the Berlin election campaign Mr Momper rejected any coalition with the Greens, and only a few hours after the election results were available he made a 180-degree turn. This cheating of the voters manifests the SPD's political unreliability. [applause, jeers] [passage omitted]

SDP's Ehmke Speaks

AU2704155389 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 1052 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Statement by Horst Ehmke, Social Democratic Party Bundestag group deputy floor leader, in the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 27 April—live]

[Text] Mrs President, ladies and gentlemen: For most people the saying holds true—once bitten twice shy. For you, Mr Chancellor, this saying does not seem to hold true. However, this will not neutralize the contradiction that exists between the reality of our situation and the reality of your government policy. [applause] After the policy of detente as well as Ostpolitik, which was initiated by Willy Brandt and which was doggedly fought by the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Christian Social Union [CSU], has received a fresh impetus by Mikhail Gorbachev, there is an opportunity to move from the renunciation of force to common security, from economic cooperation to social reform, from humanitarian issues to the implementation of human rights—briefly, from the Helsinki Final Act to a new European peace order. [applause]

That requires a courageous, forward-looking response by the West to Gorbachev's offers, and relevant initiatives by the Federal Government. We agree on this with the foreign minister whom I would like to expressly thank for his speech today. [applause]

Mr Chancellor, the depressing thing about the situation is that instead of paving the way for Europe, this Federal Government has for years been involved in a coalition

quarrel over all these issues. In this permanent quarrel, the foreign minister has gained ground—not least owing to the special support that we, the Social Democrats, have given him.

Thus, in our relationship with Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, we are making slow but steady progress. But, Mr Chancellor, your government statement today also shows that you mostly get stuck in half measures, even though you are doing something.

Let me begin with the issue that is still a controversial one within the coalition and the alliance—the production of new U.S. nuclear missiles and their deployment on German territory. Amid all your tactical maneuvering, you apparently have forgotten the basic problem that is at issue now—namely, whether the valid NATO strategy of flexible response, which envisages a nuclear first strike by the West in response to an assumed superior conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, still meets the West European, and in particular, the German security interests. The answer to this question must be no.

This strategy, which has turned nuclear weapons of deterrence into weapons to wage war—as the foreign minister just said—would destroy what should be protected in the case of war. This has been proved once again by the Wintex 89 exercise that obviously has also worried you, Mr Chancellor. The Social Democrats will discuss this issue in committee meetings and in the Bundestag plenum.

Therefore, we Social Democrats have demanded for a long time that the analysis of the threat be revised. NATO's hypotheses on a large-scale Soviet surprise attack on West Europe are becoming increasingly unrealistic. [applause]

In addition, we demand—and with this demand that [?takes into account precisely] the Warsaw Pact's one-sided measures, we have in particular met with Mikhail Gorbachev's [?approval]—a reduction in the asymmetries of arms and forces, as well as the reduction, restructuring, and redeployment of these arms and forces. Negotiations on this have been resumed in Vienna. It must be their goal to create security policy stability, in which both sides' forces are sufficient for defense, but are not capable of attack. [applause]

Mr Chancellor, even under the valid NATO doctrine, the strategy of flexible response, which also includes a first nuclear strike by NATO, would then no longer be necessary. This strategy does not deserve its name, because it is by no means flexible. As one exercise after another has shown, it leads to a quick, early first nuclear use by the West. Such a first use, ladies and gentlemen, would by no means be a warning shot—as has often been claimed—but it would trigger a nuclear war that the

superpowers would try to limit to Europe—something I find quite understandable from their viewpoint. That has also been shown once again in the Wintex exercise this year.

Therefore, we Social Democrats demand in addition that in the process of the reduction of nuclear weapons, that was envisaged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in parallel with the development of a strategy of common security, nuclear weapons be deprived of their offensive role in Europe, be reassigned their political function of deterrence, and be reduced stepwise in this function.

The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons must be viewed in connection with the establishment of the conventional incapacity of attack. All elements must be considered, because in the area of nuclear artillery, one-sided measures of the West, and in the area of short-range nuclear weapons one-sided measures of the Warsaw Pact seem to be necessary. [applause] Both issues can be dealt with separately, but must be viewed and judged in context.

If we consider, in the light of this basic representation, the compromise agreed on by the coalition, that the Chancellor gave a report on today, the following can be said: The government coalition also demands negotiations, which we welcome. However, Mr Waigel, we would have preferred a formulation that sounded less like a compromise. We want to have such negotiations immediately, without any further tactical maneuvers. [applause]

So, we will not only support the Federal Government, but we will also encourage it to demonstrate clarity and resolve. I also promise you that we for our part will do everything to make it clear to all the allies in the alliance what damage they would do to this people, if NATO were to reject the negotiations that the Soviets have already accepted. [applause]

Regarding the objective of the necessary negotiations, your compromise is not entirely clear either. Considering what I said about the basic aspects, we must seek to achieve the total elimination of both sides' tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It would not help us to confine ourselves to a bit of nuclear war. The restriction to upper ceilings that would be less than the present quantities could be an interim step toward a third zero solution. However, Mr Chancellor, the experience of the INF negotiations shows that some aspects of verification clearly speak for a direct zero solution, because a direct zero solution would be much easier to verify than the observance of upper ceilings. Because the Soviets have also agreed to hold negotiations on a third zero solution, this must be tested at the negotiating table, in parallel with the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. The CDU/CSU and the coalition cannot continue making tactical maneuvers on this issue.

You also dealt only tactically with the issue of new short-range nuclear missiles with European ranges—that is the point. You say that the development of such weapons is a national affair of the United States, and you are trying to postpone a decision on the production and deployment on our territory until after the Bundestag elections. It is not judiciousness, but merely your fear of the voters that has determined the CDU/CSU's position. [applause]

We Social Democrats consider these plans to step up armament and (?the tug-of-war) about them to be irresponsible, because they are bound to strain, and possibly even jeopardize, the process of detente, disarmament, and understanding between the pacts. In addition, experience has sufficiently shown—and we only need to consider the balanced and absurd overkill capacity of both sides—that we can achieve security only by way of more disarmament, and not by way of another arms race involving new and more modern weapons systems. [applause]

Mr Chancellor, a clear position is required because of the alliance. The current difficulties with Washington, Mr Chancellor, surely are also the result of your tactical maneuvers over many years. It is not enough to say how proud you are of the confidence of our American friends. You have to restore it time and again. A clear position is also required because of the further acceptance of the alliance and the Bundeswehr by our people. Just how much the unclear statements on security policy, the alliance's strategy, and the mission of the Armed Forces must strain the Bundeswehr, is obvious. We have seen that civil authorities just refuse to cooperate in scenarios of exercises, because they consider them suicidal. Mr Chancellor, in this light, how can you expect confidence and a consensus? [applause]

I state on behalf of the Social Democrats: We need the alliance, and we also continue to need the Bundeswehr. Those who dispute this consensus, harm both. [applause] However, harm is also done by those who insist on outdated ideas and clichés, instead of developing the alliance regarding its policy, strategy, and doctrine, as well as regarding the structure of its forces and the nature of its weapon systems in a way allowing it to live up to the new realities and to gain new consent and new credibility among our citizens.

This is also decisive for the self-realization and the self-confidence of our citizens in uniform who serve in the Bundeswehr. Who would like to do military service without knowing what for? [applause] Young officers have told us time and again that young recruits cannot be motivated by what comes from Hardthoehe [FRG Defense Ministry]. Dismissing this as slackness or neutralism, only shows that one does not take the problems of the Bundeswehr and the people in it seriously. [applause] Generally, this also holds true for social and

family affairs. It would be good if we also considered the human factor a bit more in security policy as well, and not only always new, more perfect, and more expensive weapon systems.

Talking about this factor, I mean both the people in the Bundeswehr and the people who are the victims of the megalomania of low-altitude flights and maneuvers. [applause] Mr Chancellor, you have additionally aggravated the objectively difficult situation of the Bundeswehr by making only wrong decisions about Hardthoehe, beginning with personnel matters. It was wrong to [words indistinct], it was wrong to send Scholz there, and it is also wrong to appoint Stoltenberg as his successor. [applause]

I state that you cannot react to the divergence of personnel, arms, and financial planning in the Bundeswehr with morale-boosting slogans. You must start restructuring the Bundeswehr, instead of postponing it. [applause] Regarding the subject that has been broached by the Free Democratic Party [FDP]—conscientious objectors and the appeal of the trade unions—I must say this: The worst thing that we have experienced in the area of the Bundeswehr and the credibility of policy was that mixture of opportunism and dilettantism with which you discussed the problems of military service and civilian substitute service. I am telling the FDP in this respect that the role that Graf Lambsdorff has played has convinced me that he is not up to the task of FDP chairman. [shouts, applause]

I am also telling you that you will not be able to change your failure regarding the extension of military service by the formula of suspending it instead of sitting it out, nor—I am going to talk about that, too; an information minister should show more calmness, Johnny—I am adding for the FDP that you surely do not believe that you can get away from this bad failure regarding the draftees by maliciously attacking the trade unions, or by attacking people who reject military service on the basis of their pacifist attitude, which I do not share. This is an evil diversion, precisely of the FDP. [applause]

Summing it up, in this area, too, in the area of foreign policy, security policy, and the Bundeswehr our people need and want to have a new policy and a different government. [applause]

SPD's Vogel Speaks

AU2704152989 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 0825 27 Apr 89

[Speech by SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel at the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 27 April—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Mr Chancellor, you are adorning yourself with borrowed plumes [applause]—also in the field of foreign and security policy, because the easing of tensions in the relations between the superpowers, their increasing readiness for cooperation,

and the progress made in the process of disarmament are mainly the results of the reform policy and the restructuring in the Soviet Union and of Gorbachev's unilateral disarmament measures for the elimination of Soviet superiority, but also of the increasing understanding for these developments in the United States. And if there are concepts that have given stimuli to this, they were the concepts of a new Ostpolitik we have developed [applause] and the path started in Helsinki toward a European peace order. Both are concepts that were pushed through together with the liberals, but against you and your bitter resistance.

How you can talk today about the process toward a unification of Europe in a European peace order without recalling that you were the ones who rejected Helsinki, and how you can claim that without you this process would not have existed is once again characteristic of you. [applause] [passage omitted]

Concerning the question of the so-called modernization, you are not strong enough to completely change your stance and to voice a clear "no." Of course—and I would like to say, much to our pleasure—you are now also advocating negotiations on a nuclear short-range reduction, a demand we have made for a long time. This is good and we fully support this step. Whenever Mr Genscher resolutely holds this view, he can also count on our support. However, whenever you begin to retreat from this position you can no longer rely on our support. Yet you want to wait with the decision about the production and the deployment of new and more deadly nuclear missiles with an even greater range—this is behind the euphemistic term modernization. You do not want to decide on the so-called modernization—a deceptive term—now, but only after the Bundestag elections. The third zero option, which would have to be supported by all reasons of common sense, and which—I predict—will be suggested by the USSR sooner or later, is another subject you want to hear nothing about, and on which you act only half-heartedly. This will create a situation in which we will once again end up falling between all the stools. Do you really believe, Mr Chancellor, that our people would accept new armament, the deployment of new, dangerous, and longer-range missiles? You know as well as I do that the overwhelming majority of our people reject such a move. [applause]

By the way, particularly after what has come to light these days concerning the last Wintex exercise and what was seriously and constructively discussed in the joint committee under the chairmanship of the Bundestag president yesterday, which was a discussion about a horror scenario in which already on the 6th or 7th day of the exercise—through the use of at least 30 nuclear explosive devices, each of which with a destructive strength several times greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb—everything that is to be protected will be destroyed, I note with satisfaction that even you, Mr Chancellor, at a relatively late stage, have intervened and made it clear that this is madness, but not an exercise of useful methods. [applause]

Therefore, I ask you to also settle all other points, a clear stance helps the alliance, whereas twilight, lack of clarity, and ambiguity strain the alliance. [passage omitted]

Today, too, we are not limiting ourselves to criticism. We clearly state what we want to do better and we will explain this in detail. Therefore, I will limit myself to the concentrated description of the 12 most important elements of our alternative concept. They are:

First, the further elimination of the mutual enemy images in East-West relations; peaceful competition and cooperation of the different social systems; safeguarding of individual and social human rights. [applause]

Second, the demilitarization of relations between the alliances; dynamization of the disarmament process until a state of affairs, which links complete defense capability with the final inability of both sides to carry out large-scale attacks, while drastically reducing the overall level. No new nuclear missiles, no extension of compulsory military service, restructuring of the Bundeswehr while adjusting the force strength to the real, that is reduced, threat; cessation of low-altitude flights. [applause]

Third, rechanneling resources, which are still being wasted on excessive armament all over the world, for mastering those challenges which threaten mankind as a whole and constitute the dangers of our time, in particular averting the deterioration of the climate and overcoming the escalating North-South gap.

Fourth, overcoming the division of Europe and thus the division of Germany and of Berlin through a European peace order, which would make the borders lose their separating function and safeguard human rights. This, Mr Chancellor, not only corresponds to the preamble of our Basic Law but it is the assignment given by this preamble. [applause] [passage omitted]

CDU/CSU's Dregger Speaks

AU2704142289 Munich Bayerischer Rundfunk
Network in German 0930 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Speech by CDU/CSU Bundestag group Chairman Alfred Dregger at the Bundestag debate in Bonn on 27 April]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] What applies to economic, financial, and social policy also applies to our foreign and security policy. We have scored successes in this sphere. We have made progress in the field of European policy under FRG chairmanship. The common single market which is to be established in 1992 has breathed new life into the community and produced fresh hopes. There has never been any doubt abroad that this is a personal success of the FRG chancellor. [applause]

Our reliability in the counterarmament issue in 1982-83 and in our disarmament policy has prompted fresh confidence in both East and West. This is an asset that will make it possible for us to go through the conflict that has emerged within the alliance on the issue of counterarmament and disarmament in the sphere of short-range nuclear systems. Our interests do not coincide in every respect with the ideas of our main ally. To win him over to our German position, which we have outlined, will only be possible with the help of the great reserve of confidence that we, the coalition, the foreign minister, and particularly Chancellor Helmut Kohl, have created over the past few years. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, those who regard the superpower the United States as an absolute opponent, such as the Greens, or those who form a government coalition with the opponent of our main ally, as the Social Democratic Party [SPD] did—first in Hesse and then in Berlin and, if election results permit, they would like to do the same at the federal level—those who are willing and ready to pursue such a policy are incapable of safeguarding German interests. This is not possible. [applause] If one of the main political figures of the Senat in Berlin, which is backed by the SPD and the Alternative List, says that the president of the United States, without which a free Berlin would not exist, is not welcome, the SPD's coalition partner is not only misbehaving in a way that violates all traditions of international policy, particularly concerning heads of state, this partner is also politically insane, and harms Berlin and Germany. [passage indistinct] [applause]

As the chancellor already mentioned, we are expecting U.S. President Bush, with whom we have long had friendly relations, at the end of May. In June, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev will visit the FRG. The short period between the two visits shows the high standing that the chancellor and the government enjoy here and in the whole world. [applause]

I participated in the chancellor's talks in Moscow from 24-27 October 1988. The talks were fruitful and we want to continue them in the spirit of cooperation. We are firmly resolved not to waste a chance in our relations with the Soviet Union that serve peace in Europe and that benefit German and European interests. With the growing political and economic weight, our country's responsibility for Third World countries increases as well. We are facing problems today that cannot be solved by a single state, but which are decisive for the survival of mankind. This includes banishing the danger to the ozone layer and a halt to the exploitation of the tropical rain forests. The chancellor addressed this issue this morning and we welcome the fact that he is particularly concerned about this issue. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, we are cooperating in an efficient and trusting manner within the coalition. The German position on negotiations within the alliance on the comprehensive concept, on the disarmament initiative, on

the deployment decision, has been jointly worked out by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] and the Free Democratic Party. All coalition partners support this concept without any reservation and to the same extent. I would like to stress this to prevent people from thinking that they can weaken the German position by dissolving our consensus within the government, within the coalition. The German position is a proposal to our allies, not an ultimatum. Our goal is to agree on a position within the alliance that can be backed by all 16 alliance partners. I request our allies at this point to understand the unique situation of our people, which is the only one in Europe that is divided by a military border, separating East and West. For this reason, our people suffer most from the division of Europe. Thus, we are of course particularly interested in gradually converting, in agreement with our neighbors and with both superpowers, the encrusted order of war of 1945 into a state of peace in which human rights and the people's right to self-determination are implemented. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Bonn's Security Policy, Role in NATO

AU2404172289 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 22-23 Apr 89 p 4

[Josef Joffe commentary: "Bonn in the Alliance—Unpredictable?"]

[Text] Gerhard Stoltenberg's nine predecessors in the Defense Ministry—from Theodor Blank to Rupert Scholz—have not had much luck. According to Erwin Horn, military expert of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany, it is "a murderous office," which no one "leaves in the same physical and psychological state as he entered it." Careers in federal politics were stopped in the "ejector seat" (look at Franz Joseph Strauss) or simply ended (look at Hans Apel and Manfred Woerner). Only one single minister, Helmut Schmidt, who later became chancellor, was able to reach a higher office after 2 years in the Defense Ministry—perhaps only because he did not have enough time in office to be worn out by it.

Historic Notch

Almost all defense ministers had bad luck—whether it was Kai-Uwe von Hassel with his "Starfighter" or Manfred Woerner with his General Kiessling. Nevertheless, the Scholz case is something special, which lets us assume that a historic notch has been cut. It may be that the professor of law was "cold" and "arrogant"; it may also be that the government mechanisms of the Bonn republic have meanwhile become so isolated and standardized that "outsiders" are crushed like faulty wheels. No matter whether it was the man or his bad luck—last year another burden was added, which will also harass Stoltenberg and his successor: FRG security policy, which has followed a few simple but iron-clad rules for 40 years, is changing.

Deterrence, alliance, and America—time is gnawing at these three pillars of the classical German security policy. Rupert Scholz either did not realize this—or he believed that the process can be stopped, slowed down, or channeled within the framework of tradition. How Stoltenberg wants to tackle this is still in the stars on day 2 of his term of office—in particular in view of a government which, for reasons of preserving power, considers certain things superfluous today that were considered indispensable yesterday. Stoltenberg was shifted, not elevated. He is not a “defense expert in the strict sense” (Stoltenberg about himself), and his political weight—in the past he was considered Kohl’s successor—has melted away. Of course, the new minister can boast of one important advantage: He is deeply rooted in the establishment of the Christian Democratic Union, he knows the traps and snares of Bonn, he has a dynastic power in the party. Therefore, it will not be quite so easy to take him apart.

The Man in the Ejector Seat

The man in the ejector seat is not only minister for the Bundeswehr and for procurement, he is also minister for the alliance. And there, in the alliance, things are on fire. The fire is only glimmering at the moment, and it can be kept so for some time by compromises on formulas in the question of nuclear modernization. But the problem is a more profound one. At the latest military conference in Munich a Briton defined it—perhaps a bit exaggerated—as follows: “Are the Germans on the point of unconsciously moving out of NATO?” One can also say this in more precise and balanced terms: The West Germans continue to support NATO, the U.S. presence, and the Bundeswehr; in fact the rates of approval among the public—about 80 percent—are even higher today than in the 1970’s. However, today the FRG citizens are obviously no longer willing to pay the old price for this reassuring state of affairs. According to the polls, they want a denuclearization of West European defense (79 percent); they are against low-altitude flights, large-scale maneuvers, and the extension of compulsory military service.

According to Theo Waigel, chairman of the Christian Social Union, yesterday Bonn wanted to stress “our defense readiness toward our partners” with the extension of compulsory military service and the Free Democratic Party joined it in stressing this. Today, however, “new figures” apply or new assessments. Thus, is what is wrong today what was right yesterday—or has it always been wrong? Did one submit to the reason of alliance at the beginning of the year, and if this is so, why does it not apply any longer? Last year Chancellor Kohl (unofficially) assured every emissary of the alliance that the Lance follow-up systems will not be thwarted by the German will and the “overall concept” will tie disarmament and modernization into a solid package. In the meantime, the overall concept that has been demanded

by the Germans has become a bitter joke in NATO, not least because of Bonn’s stalling, and modernization is being postponed at Bonn’s urging—and will perhaps be abolished after 1991.

The explanation for the twisting and turning is simple; it lies in Berlin and in Frankfurt and in the opinion polls that predict devastating election defeats of the Union. Certainly, a democratic regime cannot and must not govern by passing over the will of the voters. Nevertheless, every government has to establish an acceptable balance between the reason of party and the reason of state, and this balance has been lost over the past weeks. In Washington, London, and Paris the FRG has become an unpredictable quantity and this does not help anyone—not even Gorbachev, whose followers have meanwhile started to announce everywhere that they want NATO’s continuing existence, including an FRG anchored in NATO.

Age-Old Dilemma of the Alliance

The problem is all the more difficult since America, the second locomotive of NATO, also shows symptoms of decoupling itself. With the 1987 INF Treaty, the United States has unwillingly or willingly turned the age-old dilemma of the alliance—how can there be a nuclear guarantee that includes the risk of self-destruction—to its benefit in such a way that now the intermediate-range missiles that personify the link between the fates of the United States and Europe are being withdrawn. No wonder that since then the Germans—both on the left and on the right—have insisted on reducing their nuclear risk too: by reducing the short-range missiles, which are able to destroy only central Europe.

This makes conventional deterrence move all the more into the foreground. But if the Germans refuse to accept the U.S. nuclear weapons, which four-fifths of the citizens seem to wish, will the U.S. troops still stay—which four-fifths of the people also want? Will the Bundeswehr be cut back one-sidedly, will the others who are on guard here—Americans, Canadians, British, French—then be more willing to defend the country than the Germans? Figures on troops and weapons in central Europe are certainly not ironclad but the Bonn Government has to recognize with utmost speed that they have a different role in the alliance than the Danish or the Belgians. Bonn’s actions or omissions have consequences.

This is not much changed by Bonn’s pioneering role in disarmament policy and ostpolitik, either. Europe is now facing the historic chance of alleviating or overcoming the worst consequences of World War II. However, Bonn is interesting for Gorbachev only as long as its voice is heard in the alliance. And there the FRG’s influence depends on its reliability and predictability. Stoltenberg, Kohl, and Genscher know this. Even a red-green coalition would not be able to close itself off against this insight.

**Foreign Minister Genscher: Allies
'Overwhelmingly' Back SNF Talks**
*LD2304192189 Hamburg DPA in German
1755 GMT 23 Apr 89*

[Text] FRG Foreign Minister Genscher has stressed that the issue of negotiations [on short-range missiles] must now be discussed among the allies, "in order to then find the shared position within the alliance". In an interview on the Today program of the Second German television (ZDF) on Sunday [23 April] evening, Genscher pointed out "that like us, the European allies quite overwhelmingly stand by what we earlier set our sights on, namely negotiations".

He denied that there was any danger that Bonn's position could put it out of line with NATO. "After all, we want nothing other than what the alliance decided on in Reykjavik in 1987, and also in Brussels in 1988, namely that there should be negotiations on short-range weapons as well."

**Foreign Minister Genscher on Short-Range
Missile Negotiations**
*AU2304180589 Mainz ZDF Television Network
in German 1700 GMT 23 Apr 89*

[Interview with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Klaus Walter in Bonn on 23 April—recorded]

[Text] [Walter] Mr Minister, tomorrow you are going to Washington. The German position concerning short-range missiles has been worked out. Now how do you want to convince the Americans, after Washington at the beginning of the week stated that negotiations with the Soviets about short-range missiles are out of the question for the time being?

[Genscher] Naturally, the decision will be made within the alliance, but a few weeks ago the U.S. secretary of defense was here and now colleague Stoltenberg and I are going to Washington in order to continue the talks. We do not want anything other than what the alliance decided as early as in Reykjavik in 1987 and also in Brussels in 1988, namely that short-range missiles are also to be included in negotiations. We live in a time in which, thank God, security problems are not being settled by an arms race and there is the opportunity for negotiations, which we naturally want to seize.

[Walter] However, the Americans say no. Therefore, talks have to be held with the Americans first.

[Genscher] I think that we will discuss this question—as is necessary and correct among allies and friends—in order to then find a common position within the alliance. We know that, like us, the large majority of the European allies stand for what we planned in the past, that is, negotiations.

[Walter] However, criticism has already been reported from London. After the long tug-of-war about the German position, does Bonn not place itself in danger of again becoming an outsider within NATO with this position that has now been found?

[Genscher] No, this is certainly not the case when one supports what the alliance has planned—also with U.S. and British approval—and, above all, when most allies support this position, too.

**SPD's Vogel Sees 'National Consensus' on
Missile Issue**

*LD2504093389 Hamburg DPA in German 0904 GMT
25 Apr 89*

[Text] [No dateline as received] Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of the SPD and head of the Lower House party group, now sees in essence a national consensus between the government and the opposition on the missile issue. Speaking to journalists, he welcomed as a progressive move the fact that now the coalition, like the SPD, is pressing for parallel negotiations with Eastern Europe on a reduction of both short-range and conventional weapons.

But his party was still critical of the fact that the coalition had not managed to reach a clear no to the replacement of the "Lance" missiles with a new system, but wanted to keep a decision open until after the next Federal elections. Nor was such a stance fair toward the main ally, the United States. Vogel did not rule out the possibility that Washington is insisting on a tough stance toward Bonn, because this would also tie the hands of a future FRG government of a different political persuasion.

**SPD Calls for Immediate Short-Range Missile
Talks**

*AU2504085889 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 25
Apr 89 p 4*

["rmc" report: "SPD Calls for 'Immediate' Talks on Short-Range Missiles"]

[Excerpts] Bonn—The Social Democratic Party of Germany rejects the solution found by Bonn's coalition to the issue of modernization, that is, calling for negotiations "as soon as possible" with the East on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces (SFN) and deciding on the deployment of new systems only in 1991/92, as something "that has got stuck halfway."

The Goal: Complete Elimination

Instead, Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag group, on behalf of his group, called for "immediate" negotiations between East and West about the SNF systems with a range of up to 500 km. The goal

is the complete elimination of such weapons. Ehmke stressed that the SPD and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher agree regarding this demand. [passage omitted]

Ehmke said: "These negotiations could be held separately from the negotiations on conventional disarmament; the results of the two negotiations must, however, be evaluated together." In principle, the SPD politician said, that if conventional stability is achieved in Europe, under whose regime the armed forces of both sides are exclusively sufficient for defense but incapable of large-scale or surprise attacks, "nuclear weapons would become superfluous in Europe."

No Counterarmament

Ehmke repeated the well-known SPD demand on abandoning NATO's strategy of deterrence and replacing it with a strategy of "common security" between East and West. Any kind of "nuclear arms buildup or counterarmament in Europe" must be renounced. The military doctrines of both sides must be revised and NATO must turn away from the first use of nuclear weapons, Ehmke stressed.

Press Comments on SNF Modernization Controversy

AU2604101489 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 26 Apr 89

[From the press review]

[Text] The FRG press today comments on the controversy surrounding the modernization of NATO short-range missiles. HANNOVERSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG writes: Chancellor Kohl can remain calm concerning at least one issue of his government statement. The lightning visit to Washington by Ministers Genscher and Stoltenberg has led to the defusion two German-U.S. conflicts. The controversial issues were the date of a decision on the replacement of the Lance short-range nuclear missile—if a replacement is required at all—and the German proposal to conduct general negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles. The United States accepted the German standpoint that there is no need to make a decision before 1992 and that the decision that may then be necessary depends essentially on the German vote. In the other issue, the United States has at least not rejected Bonn's arguments favoring a formulation that takes into consideration the position of both sides.

BERLINER MORGENPOST comes to the opposite conclusion: Despite all appeasement efforts, Foreign Minister Genscher's call for a reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, as stipulated in the coalition statement, has put NATO in a difficult position. Bonn is once more faced with the allegation of being an unreliable alliance partner because of its solo attempt in the missile issue. U.S. and British commentators have been voicing

this opinion. It remains to be seen how the chancellor will deal with the serious differences of opinion between Bonn and Washington during tomorrow's government statement. Following the reluctant decision by the United States and Great Britain to agree to the suspension of the decision on the Lance missile, Genscher and Stoltenberg met with clear resistance concerning their wish to open early negotiations with the Soviets on a reduction of these systems.

HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT also does not consider the missile controversy settled following the Genscher-Stoltenberg visit. It states: The term "disaster" describes only insufficiently the panic-like attempt of the still ailing foreign minister and the defense novice Stoltenberg to seek refuge from attack, which led to the known depressing result. The fact that the two envoys, who were treated icily in Washington, tried to weaken their foreign-policy defeat after they had returned from their trip in a tired-out state, seems plausible and pardonable in view of the government statement scheduled for tomorrow. However, the crisis between Washington and Bonn is now painfully visible.

MANNHEIMER MORGEN stresses: The reasons for the current problems within the alliance is the INF Treaty, under which the intermediate-range missiles of both sides have been eliminated in Europe. Those who considered this a grave mistake in 1987 receive confirmation today. The Pershing 2 missiles represented the link between the European NATO members and the United States and should, therefore, have been the last step within disarmament, but by no means the first one. What is making matters worse is that the government's clumsy tactics have led to a decline in confidence which will be difficult to reverse. The dramatic appeal by the U.S. president to Bonn not to risk a solo attempt is unprecedented in the alliance's history and demonstrates that other countries consider the basis of the alliance to be in danger.

CDU's Dregger on Missile Modernization

AU2604103789 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 26 Apr 89 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union Bundestag Group: "The Americans Need Us"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr Dregger, is the concept of the Bonn coalition on the short-range missile issue a sign of weakness?

[Dregger] No. The German proposal corresponds to the interests of the alliance as well as to German security interests. Neither the alliance nor the FRG can be indifferent to the fact that the Soviet Union has a

superiority of 16 to 1 concerning ground-based short-range weapons, which are aimed almost exclusively at Germany. We have to change this. We need common upper limits for both sides, which are below the current NATO level.

[Question] American and British circles fear that negotiations on the short-range systems will unavoidably lead to another zero-option.

[Dregger] No. A third zero-option can be excluded as not negotiable in the Western negotiation concept. Common upper limits are realistic. Even Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov agreed with such a solution during his recent visit to Bonn.

[Question] What do you demand of the overall NATO concept?

[Dregger] It must maintain a security policy which does not permit the development of zones of different security in the alliance. In the nuclear age this means a sharing of risk among the allies and a union of deterrence between Europe and the United States.

Therefore, the overall concept must make clear that nuclear weapons serve deterrence and not war.

[Question] Are you not afraid that the discussion about the short-range missiles may promote isolationist trends in the United States?

[Dregger] We need the United States if we want to hold out as a free country at the military border between East and West, which is independent of the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. We want this.

However, the Americans also need us. Without the reliability and strength of the FRG as a NATO ally, Western Europe would become dependent on the Soviet Union.

We Germans would have preferred the start of nuclear disarmament in the form of a zero-option for missiles with a range of under 500 km. Since this could not be achieved, we agreed to the intermediate-range missile solution as a first step of nuclear disarmament. But with this we have not renounced striving for nuclear disarmament in the field which threatens us in particular, that is, in the field of missiles with a range of under 500 km.

Kohl Stresses FRG Interests on Missile Issues
LD2604194889 Hamburg DPA in German
1843 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] Oldenburg (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has this evening underlined the Federal Republic's interests on the issue of short-range nuclear missiles. He told an audience of 1,500 at a Christian Democratic Union rally in Oldenburg that his commitment to this issue corresponds to his oath of office. This weapons

affects Germans on both sides of the border first and foremost. However he is sure that good results will be achieved on this issue at the NATO summit in May.

It is his duty to point out about the disarmament process that if there is disarmament for far-off NATO countries "we too would like to enjoy sensible disarmament decisions," Kohl said. To applause the chancellor gave an assurance that the Federal Republic is a reliable partner. He does not need remedial lessons in alliance loyalty neither in the Federal Republic, nor in Europe, nor in the United States of America. However part of friendship is knowing and respecting one's friend's interests." Kohl stressed that a policy "which drives us into prior concessions" cannot be made with me.

President von Weizsaecker Denies Rift with Allies over SNF

LD2604152789 Hamburg DPA in German
1437 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Excerpt] Copenhagen (DPA)—Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker today in Copenhagen defended Bonn's position in the NATO row on the modernization of the Lance short-range nuclear missiles in an extraordinarily clear form. At a news conference on the occasion of his state visit to Denmark, he indirectly touched on the arguments of the Washington and London governments and said, "The fairy tale of the isolation of the Federal Republic by its position can be completely done away with."

The Federal Government's proposals had been made in complete harmony with NATO decisions of the past few years. Weizsaecker said, adding: "It would be a good thing if the NATO countries on the continent of Europe were allowed to express themselves instead of using representatives without representative power."

The Federal president pointed out that Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen had assured his country's support for the Federal Republic's position. The subject of short-range missiles had also played a significant role during a political meeting with Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter. [passage omitted]

Ambassador Walters Envoy Remarks on Missiles Debate Cited

LD2704173989 Hamburg DPA in German
1626 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] Hannover (DPA)—The new U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic, Vernon A. Walters, regards modern nuclear weapons as the "lifeblood of the alliance". If individual allies "try to get around the sharing of risks", this would "release centrifugal forces in the alliance which may have catastrophic effects for everyone". Referring to the debate on NATO's short-range missiles, Walters said in Hanover Thursday [27 April]: "We must keep our nuclear weapons up-to-date and effective against all types of military threat."

As long as there were no signs that the "Soviet capability for conducting an attack on the West has been substantially weakened", this also necessitated the possession of the "required modern conventional and nuclear weapons", he said. Walters said in connection with the irritations between Bonn and Washington that there was a tendency to take the view that "the Federal republic has unjustly become a target for American criticism". Now and again serious differences of opinion occurred "and if that is the case, then we should tackle the matter objectively".

The ambassador was giving the "Karl-Heinz Beckurts memorial speech" at the invitation of the "Atlantic Bridge", which promotes German-U.S. understanding. The nuclear physicist Beckurts was killed in a Red Army Faction bomb attack in 1986.

SED/SPD Working Group on Security Issues Meets

Meeting Opens in Bonn

*LD2704121289 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0846 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The joint Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]/Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] Working Group on security policy issues in Europe, today met in Bonn for its ninth round of deliberations.

The exchange of opinions, chaired by Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, as well as Egon Bahr, member of the SPD Presidium, serves the further discussion of questions of nonattack capability and adequate defense.

Session Continues

*LD2704153989 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1247 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Joint Working Group of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Central Committee and the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] Bundestag Group on issues of security policy has today continued its work in Bonn with its ninth meeting. The round of discussion served the further discussion of issues of nonattack capability and adequate defense.

The further development of European security was discussed, taking into account the Vienna talks which have started in the meantime on conventional forces and confidence-building measures. The working group expressed the hope that the talks will progress swiftly and constructively. It will also concentrate on working out its own proposals which will promote this progress.

The start of negotiations soon on the inclusion of nuclear weapons with a range of under 500 km is seen as particularly necessary. The reduction and step by step

removal of these weapons is an integral condition for stable security in Europe. The Warsaw Pact's readiness for negotiations on this area should be answered constructively by NATO.

The working group sees the main issues for making the world and Europe safer in halving strategic nuclear weapons belonging to the United States and the USSR, ending nuclear weapons testing, as well as banning chemical weapons globally. The joint working group stated that their proposals for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor, as well as for a zone of trust and security in central Europe, are very topical.

The working group welcomed the unilateral disarmament steps by the USSR, the GDR and other Warsaw Pact states, fulfillment of which will begin in the next few weeks and which are to be concluded by the end of 1990. They will represent a significant step toward reducing military confrontation and distrust. The working group agreed to continue its work in Berlin on 14 June 1989.

Taking part in the meeting from the SED side were: Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee; Professor Joachim Boehm, deputy director of a department of the Central Committee; Prof Manfred Mueller, head of the Questions of Basic Principle Department at the Potsdam-Babelsberg Institute for International Relations; Dr Guenther Hillmann, head of department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Karl-Heinz Wagner, employee of the SED Central Committee.

From the SPD side: Egon Bahr, chairman of the Bundestag subcommittee for disarmament and arms control and member of the SPD Presidium; Dr Andreas von Buelow, member of the Defense Committee and member of the Security Policy Commission of the SPD Party Executive; Karsten D. Voigt, chairman of the chemical weapons working group and head of the SPD Bundestag group on the Foreign Affairs Committee as well as member of the SPD party executive; Dr Hermann Scheer, head of the SDP Bundestag group on the subcommittee for disarmament and arms control and member of the SPD party council; Erwin Horn, head of the SPD Bundestag group on the Defense Committee; as well as Dr Uwe Stehr and Wolfgang Wiemer, employees of the SPD Bundestag group.

FRANCE

Comments on Vienna CFE Talks: Warnings, Time Factor

Western Unity Essential

52002419 Paris LE FIGARO in French 6 Mar 89 p 1

[Editorial by Jean Francois-Poncet: "A Crucial Test"]

[Text] Negotiations on "conventional armed forces in Europe," which are beginning in Vienna, will be a crucial test for the future of East and West relations. They will

reveal, beyond words, the real nature of Soviet intentions; they will make it possible to measure the determination and unity of the West before Gorbachev's peace offensive.

Hopes and fears, promises and dangers are in balance.

Hope is two-fold: military and political. For western Europe, it involves the disappearances of the threat in which 50,000 tanks, 40,000 artillery pieces, 2,500 bridge-laying units, massed before the Soviet military machine, permanently menace it. The main goal of the western negotiations is to make a surprise attack impossible and a large scale offensive difficult.

They will also pursue a political objective, promoting the liberation and development of eastern Europe, by reducing the size of the Soviet forces stationed there, not only to face the West, but to preserve the status quo.

The reduction in personnel and equipment to be carried out will have to be, like the existing forces, glaringly unequal. That is the main difficulty in the negotiations. The unilateral reductions announced in December by Gorbachev have brought the level of forces closer, it is true. But the difference is substantial and the negotiations will not progress unless the USSR accepts in good faith, the demand for equality which the West would not be able to relinquish in any case.

Full of promise, the proceedings in Vienna are also fraught with risks for the West. Moscow will attempt—how can you blame it?—to impose on Europe, through negotiation and disarmament, a hegemony which neither intimidation nor overarmament have given it. It is an ambition whose ways and means are well known: 1) divert the negotiations from their objective—conventional weapons—towards the nuclear, to impose on Germany a third and final “opposition zero” and on France, as well as Great Britain, the freezing of their nuclear strike forces; 2) detach America, as much as possible, from Europe; 3) fragment the western defense in “zones” with a special status; 4) neutralize western public opinion on which Moscow counts, at least as much as on its own diplomats, to disarm the European and American governments.

The negotiations which are beginning are important. They will be technical, complicated, and long. Everything indicates that the USSR wants the negotiations to succeed. Everything also indicates that they will turn out for the best or the worst, depending on whether the West, while showing initiative and openness, proclaims its unity and its will or it indulges in its old vices, delusions, and divisions.

Soviet Intentions

52002419 Paris LE MONDE in French
7 Mar 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Claire Trean: “Reduction of Regular Forces Test of Detente in Europe”]

[Text] On Sunday, 5 March, Mr Shevardnadze called the negotiations which opened in Vienna on Monday “an

unprecedented moment in the history of Europe.” On this occasion, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs will meet for the first time his new American counterpart, James Baker. These negotiations between the 16 countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the 7 members of the Warsaw Pact are considered a test of the new detente between East and West.

The French have been rather indifferent to disarmament questions until now. They have impassively attended the discussions of the two superpowers on nuclear weapons, without feeling really concerned and without the process creating many political strategy experts. But before concluding we have a national shortcoming, let us take the time to estimate the response which the new negotiations opening this week in Vienna will receive in France.

They will not discuss deterrent weapons there, which will never be used, but tanks, guns, and soldiers. They will not speak there of the apocalypse which is an abstraction, but of invasion and occupation, of the threat which weighs most directly on western Europe, namely the huge concentration of troops and equipment on the other side of the iron curtain and their offensive position.

They will discuss it—even if the forum brings the Warsaw Pact and NATO face to face—among 23 sovereign states, in principle. At least by this it is understood by France, which for the first time in a very long time, that the country is fully involved in disarmament negotiations. There is indeed the Geneva parley on chemical disarmament, but besides the fact that it involves weapons which France declares it does not possess, they do not have the same potential impact on the resources which the military establishment has available and involving their use.

The military will be involved in the negotiation (three high ranking officers are to be part of the French delegation besides representatives of the Quai d'Orsay) and on the part of the Ministry of Defense, it will be necessary to count on the keen interest of Mr Chevènement in strategic questions and their political implications.

For the negotiations which are going to open, if they promise to be long, technical, and complicated they are also by nature incomparably political. It is also a test of East-West detente: whether they become bogged down (like the so-called MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction] negotiations in which France did not participate and which were scuttled after more than 15 years of sterile discussions) or whether the fine phrases of Gorbachev on the opening to the West or the European “common home” will sound more and more empty.

It is political in a more subtle fashion also for it does not only involve agreeing on total figures and a numerical parity between East and West. To only mention a few examples, withdrawing on the European chess-board

which extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, some tanks or little Czech or Hungarian soldiers, does not have the political effect nor the same meaning for the future of Europe as withdrawing some tanks or a few Soviet soldiers from Czechoslovakia or Hungary which from a strictly strategic point of view do not have a great deal to do there.

Withdrawing too many foreign forces from the two German states would not only call into question a fundamental NATO doctrine but would interfere in a mutual relationship of circumstances which in time would lead to the question—no longer military, but political—of Germany's status. On the contrary, not to withdraw enough of them, would be to pull once again two very sensitive strings in the FRG in these times, that of sovereignty and that of a certain peculiarity from which it aims to free itself. Entering these negotiations whose main objective is, supposedly, seeking parity between alliances is, not so for France, actually involved in seeking advantage for NATO. In that respect the discussions lose a little bit more of the uniqueness to which they aspire, even if the real basis of this special status is, in fact, independence in the nuclear field, an issue not on the table.

Political Negotiations

France, during the 2 years of preliminary discussions, has stressed most for a particular reason the qualitative as well as the quantitative aspect of the negotiations. It has quarreled again and again with the United States to let negotiations develop between sovereign states not between bloc and bloc, so they do not deteriorate into an American-Soviet tete-a-tete in which the Europeans and France itself could not participate. It has upheld the idea that Europe's security depends not only on military factors, but also on political and humanitarian principles. And that a formal link must be established between the military negotiations with 23 countries and all the procedures of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] with 35, also dealing with human rights. The conference has constantly emphasized the dual strategic and police role of the Soviet forces stationed in the countries of central Europe.

In this intraoccidental guerrilla warfare France has scored some points and greatly influenced the text of the mandate for the negotiations. But it has had to make some concessions. At the time for serious business, when the negotiations open, the Americans clearly would like them to stop finessing.

Mr Ledogar, chief of the American delegation says for example, "Our objective is to eliminate the military threat which hovers over us, not to destabilize central Europe. The Soviets would laugh at us if we should arrive with the French presentation."

The first imbalance which weighs on the negotiations is of a somewhat democratic nature. The Warsaw Pact will speak with a single voice while a jarring cacaphony will rise from NATO's ranks, whose restatement of the initial western proposals has already given an insight.

The other basic imbalance, which is a question of abolishing, is connected with geography and figures. The Warsaw Pact is a geographically homogenous unit, it can set in motion massive reinforcements which do not have to cross an ocean, simply several hundred kilometers. Besides, it has moreover a staggering numerical superiority in traditional weapons and means of launching a surprise offensive which NATO does not have or want. The uniqueness of these negotiations are consequently, if one abides by the terms of the mandate (excluding nuclear and naval forces, priority given to air forces), is that they pertain to western demands above all because the disparities, for all types of weaponry or almost all, favor the Warsaw Pact and it acknowledges that fact.

Soviet Intentions

They are not only admitted, but emphasized. To begin to remedy the disparities without delay, Gorbachev announced at the end of 1988 unilateral reductions of Soviet forces stationed in central Europe and the western part of the Soviet Union. Several weeks later Moscow published its figures on existing forces, attributing to the Warsaw Pact more tanks than it was credited with by western estimates.

The optimists who will see in that Moscow's desire to undertake serious negotiations will say all that is going in the right direction. On the other hand, the skeptics will think that it is too good to be true and that on the Soviet side there must be a less flexible strategy than it seems.

In fact, we have several indications of Soviet intentions, even if the Warsaw Pact has not yet made its proposals public. We cannot discard the hypothesis of a purely mediational strategy by the USSR which would give itself an attractive role vis-a-vis public opinion, while obstructing negotiations or suppressing them.

The Soviets have an interest in promoting the opening of these negotiations and they have finally been conciliatory in the definition of their mandate: in accepting that the main objective will not be the reduction of armaments but balance, in subscribing to the principle of unequal reductions without mentioning measures of reciprocity, in agreeing to exclude from negotiations naval forces and—after quibbling—the nuclear components of dual purpose weapons. While the West began to bring up the idea of mass imbalance existing in minds which had forgotten it, the Soviets then scored an important coup in announcing withdrawals of forces which did not eliminate the disparities, but, which, from the standpoint of image, gave them the advantage of every unilateral measure. Then for the first time they published numerical figures on their forces in Europe,

and they congratulated themselves on the favorable effects of glasnost in Europe, while the publication of the western figures passed by unnoticed several weeks earlier.

From these figures (which include naval forces and nuclear weapons), "an approximate parity" results between the two alliances. The Soviets have emphasized this subject several times, going so far as the statements made last week by General Akhromeyev in which Gorbachev's advisor, the former chief of the general staff, denounced in short the deception that would exist in only considering certain types of weapons and not others, with which the Warsaw Pact agrees, nevertheless.

The Soviets have several methods of unobtrusively hampering the negotiations. One of them, which would not be the worst, would consist in agreeing to the western proposals. NATO suggests an overall reduction of about 50 percent which would have to be carried out mainly by the Warsaw Pact to reestablish equality. If Moscow proposes a higher rate of reduction, especially in the central region (which would fit in fairly well with its old idea of a demilitarized central corridor), the westerners will have to either refuse—that is play the villain politically—or reconsider all the previous defense doctrines.

Another strategy would consist merely in the Warsaw Pact breaking the mold of the negotiations by trying to reintroduce naval forces or nuclear weapons. In this there is a beautiful mediation role for the Soviets to play at the moment when the FRG is tortured by the question of short-range nuclear weapons.

However, "objective" factors argue in favor of a positive behavior for the Soviets in the negotiations. They are economic especially: conventional disarmament, as opposed to nuclear or chemical produces immediate budgetary relief and Gorbachev would well need from this point of view a reduction of Red Army personnel. Technology and the modernization of equipment which is obsolete in many respects also lends to numerical reduction.

Consequently the game is worth trying. The determining factor will probably be time. While the FRG is headed towards election in 1990, while, in all probability, NATO will not have definitely settled the question of modernization of its short-range nuclear weapons before 1991, it is not very probable that the Soviets will play all their cards at first.

Editorial Criticizes President Bush's MX Decision
PM2704093089 Paris LE MONDE in French
25 Apr 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Confusion in Washington"]

[Text] Although Mr Bush belongs to the same party as Ronald Reagan and portrays himself as his heir, he is very slow in taking up the reins of office. It has taken

more than 3 months after his entry into the White House for his policy to take shape in the sphere in which his intentions were most eagerly awaited by other countries, and also the sphere in which continuity ought to have been self-evident—armaments and military strategy. Despite this delay, the cards which Mr Cheney, his new defense secretary, laid on the table on 23 April are not strikingly clear.

The long Tower affair (the first Pentagon chief whose candidacy was rejected by Congress), and the late nomination of Mr Cheney, and the need to reduce the budget deficit may explain this confusion. However, the administration has chosen neither economy nor simplicity by deciding to return to the mobile method of deployment for the MX intercontinental missile.

President Carter advocated moving the latest missile in the U.S. strategic arsenal on a kind of underground subway more than 10 years ago. At the time, Congress objected to that solution, which was scarcely less costly than the "surface" train now being proposed—not to mention the likely opposition from ecologists. This is not preventing the White House from also retaining the small Midgetman missile, which is also mobile and which has Congress' preference.

This gives the impression that Mr Bush, following the line he adopted on aid to Nicaragua and other thorny subjects, is more eager to reach compromises with his Congress than with the Soviet Union—his foreign partner most interested in this debate. The introduction of two new ground-based intercontinental missiles creates an initial dispute with Moscow because the SALT II Treaty signed 10 years ago (not ratified but, in the meantime, more or less respected by the two sides) makes provision for only one new weapon of this type in each camp.

Similarly, the slowing down of the SDI, which Mr Cheney has just confirmed (its funding will be reduced by \$7 billion in 5 years), will probably be likely to overcome Congress' reservations but it will certainly not remove the obstacles which this plan for a space shield, so dear to Mr Reagan, presents for the conclusion of a START agreement on strategic weapons.

If you add the fact that Washington is in open disagreement not only with Moscow but also with its German and Belgian allies on the tactical nuclear arms question, notably on the appropriateness of starting negotiations on this subject with Eastern Europe, it must be admitted that the Bush presidency is not starting well in the crucial disarmament sphere—the cornerstone of the alliances' cohesion and East-West stability.

ITALY

Foreign Minister Andreotti: Conventional Must Precede SNF Cuts

AU2804092789 Rome ANSA in English 0913 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Excerpt] (ANSA) Rome [no date as received]—Short-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the crisis in Lebanon

and the situation in the Middle East were the focal point of a report Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti made before the Rome Senate during a debate on two disarmament motions.

On the question of short-range or tactical nuclear missiles, the modernisation of which has led Washington and Bonn to lock horns, Andreotti underlined that with its allies Italy maintains that the reduction of the threat (from the socialist bloc) must be accompanied by modifications not only in conventional strength but also in nuclear arsenals without, however, ruling out the option of negotiation.

On when the NATO alliance should begin to adapt its nuclear forces, Andreotti affirmed "Significant progress must be made (first) in the reduction of conventional forces."

Regarding the issue of short-range missiles, Andreotti said that Italy's position, from the start, has been in line with that of West Germany. "The Bonn government", he observed, "believes that a token start is needed in the negotiations on short-range missiles."

The dispute between Washington and Bonn centers on the timetable for modernising these weapons, with West Germany seeking a delay. This position, observers say, is aimed at both offering the so-called "token" start and to help West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at home.

The Italian foreign minister then went on to state that what was needed was to give "maximum impulse" to the negotiations on chemical arms and strategic weapons.

On the question of reducing military budgets, Andreotti said here "Adequate controls must be accepted whereby every state supplies full information on their respective military spending."

Turning his attention to the prospects for international detente, Andreotti affirmed that the best policy to adopt towards Eastern Europe should be based on a "courageous thrust" towards Western European political unity which would in turn favor "A vast and peaceful transformation" of relations between present forces. [passage omitted]

NORWAY

Foreign Minister Urges Delay on NATO SNF Modernization Decision

36390054d Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
10 Mar 89 p 8

[Article by AFTENPOSTEN correspondent Stein Savik: "Stoltenberg Asks NATO to Wait"]

[Excerpt] It would be "a wrong signal at the wrong time," if NATO decides to modernize short-range nuclear missiles in Europe now.

Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg expressed this view on Thursday at a leadership conference of the Socialist International (SI) in Vienna.

In his contribution to the debate on disarmament and East-West relations, Stoltenberg at the same time spoke in favor of a new interpretation of foreign policy itself. With this as a point of departure, he developed further his address from the Labor Party's national conference and said that mutual problems also demand "a certain supra-nationality" in international organs.

As an example the foreign minister mentioned an "ecological security council," because in the area of environmental protection one must subordinate oneself to international decisions. "If we wait for unanimity, it will be too late," he said.

The 2-day long SI conference included representatives of 35 socialist and social democratic parties from all corners of the earth. Besides Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Labor Party was represented by its party secretary Thorbjorn Jagland. [passage omitted]

Ex Defense Chief on USSR's Goals in North Europe

36390054a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
7 Mar 89 p 62

[Article by Olav Trygve Storvik: "Moscow's Goal in North is Long-Range"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Attempts in the direction of glasnost and perestroika are not new in Russian history. They can be detected hundreds of years back, former defense chief Fredrik Bull-Hansen maintains.

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev has formulated a number of theses concerning the future relationships between East and West, Bull-Hansen pointed out in Oslo at the Military Society on Monday. Among these we find such expressions as "guaranteed mutual security," "reasonable force level," "necessary sufficiency," and "sensible competition."

"But it is not primarily such formulations that are qualitatively different from earlier periods of East-West detente. Many of these expressions are not new at all. If the basis for arms control initiatives seems to be more solid than in former times, this is among other things because it appears that it has come to be understood that the arms race has not given its money's worth: that nobody will win and all will lose if nuclear weapons are used in a war between East and West."

Able to Assert Itself

"But Gorbachev's goal is still a strong and self-secure Soviet Union that is able assert itself in all connections, including positions of power on this planet. We in Norway, who find ourselves in an especially exposed position, ought to remember that countries which have strategic goals and ambitions look for other, indirect strategies or methods to achieve these goals. Here also, military forces will play a significant role both for the offensive and the defensive side. Such indirect strategies do not always lead to direct results; they best serve those who think that time is on their side," Gen Bull-Hansen indicated.

600 Years of Growth

He reminds us that the Russian-dominated Soviet empire as we see it today grew gradually and persistently over a period of more than 600 years from a small Muscovite society to 285 million people who comprise many races, cultures, and languages. The driving force behind this expansion has varied through time and advances which were not successful the first time around have been achieved on the second or third attempt. For the moment, it appears that the empire cannot swallow any more without experiencing serious digestive problems.

Most people embrace Gorbachev's arms control and disarmament initiatives: confidence building measures, arms levels, zone arrangements, limitations on activities, nuclear weapons, and of land and air forces, as well as initiatives in the arctic and on the seas. Many of the proposals are original and important. We should be glad about the changes that have come but at the same time should by no means forget their starting point and the problems in determining what it is that is actually happening.

Imbalance

"Not least important in the part of the world where we live, on the outskirts of Europe, is to remember that some arms control and disarmament agreements that may appear appropriate in a large strategic picture can create an imbalance locally. On the other hand, seemingly appropriate arrangements in a local area can also unfortunately contribute to increased insecurity in the larger picture."

During Prime Minister Ryzhkov's visit to Oslo last year, some of the thoughts which Gorbachev expressed in his talk in Murmansk in the fall of 1987 were expanded upon and clarified. These proposals could hardly demonstrate more clearly that the dominant Soviet interests in the North are of a strategic nature. They do not concern themselves exclusively with fish or law, as we seemed to believe when we last discussed "zones of mutual trust and cooperation."

In sum, the proposal spelled out by Ryzhkov for a limitation of and controls over military activities at sea would imply that the Russians would continue to be of direct significance for Norwegian security in a series of ocean areas, while our allies to a large degree would be gone, Gen Bull-Hansen stated.

SPAIN

Foreign Minister Fernandez Favors 'Drastic' SNF Cuts, No Modernization

*LD2704224589 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
2100 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Excerpt] Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordenez, in parliament today, expressed his favorable attitude to a drastic reduction of short-range missiles in Europe—with consequent negotiations being held—and his opposition to the short-range missiles being modernized, at least at the moment. This position is more in line with that held by the Bonn government, which wants an immediate start to negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, than with that of the United States and Great Britain. [passage omitted]

TURKEY

Commentary on NATO Nuclear Modernization Policy

*NC2504095989 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
22 Apr 89 p 9*

[M. Ali Birand column: "Turkey Disclosed Its Nuclear Policy"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Turkey experienced an era of "uneasiness" over whether it should allow a degree of flexibility in its nuclear policy. Those who disagreed with the idea of rejecting all of General Galvin's proposals even though they implied the "adoption of new responsibilities" within the framework of the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles, and supported retaining the options, argued in "the press" with those who upheld a different viewpoint.

The question of all this was disclosed during National Defense Minister Safa Giray's speech at a NATO meeting earlier this week. "...Turkey will not undertake new responsibilities..."

Turkey went a little further and openly criticized General Galvin. It argued that although NATO has reduced its nuclear arms in stages over the past few years, the reductions have been limited only to the central region. There have been no reductions in such weapons in NATO's southern flank. On the contrary, the approach that has been adopted in that regard favors the deployment of additional arms. The political and military drawbacks of this approach also were outlined.

Whether Turkey will be able to achieve its objective is not known at the present time. However, regardless of General Galvin's hint to Defense Minister Safa Giray after the NATO meeting that he had "received the message and will make the necessary arrangement," we do not believe that a radical change will occur.

The reason behind the NATO officials' desire to increase the number of nuclear arms in Turkey is quite clear: The conventional arms in Turkey are very old and cannot be regarded as a deterrent. Since wars are not won through "heroism and faith" any more, the Turkish Armed Forces are the "weakest" army in NATO. In view of this, the defense of NATO's southern flank is regarded as the "most risky" within that organization.

Turkey is unable to allocate the required amount of funds to eliminate the existing gap. It does not have the economic strength.... The wealthy NATO countries do not wish to spend funds for that purpose either. Consequently, the idea of eliminating the gap through the deployment of short-range nuclear missiles is seen as an easy way to resolve the problem.

Nevertheless, we are not optimistic....

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher, Kinnock Clash Over NATO SNF Policy
LD2504161589 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1529 GMT 25 Apr 89

[Text] The prime minister sent a clear warning to West Germany today not to damage NATO's defence strategy by pressing ahead with demands for reduction in short range nuclear weapons.

In sharp exchanges with opposition leader Neil Kinnock at Commons question time, Mrs Thatcher said NATO's mix of conventional and nuclear weapons had kept the peace in Europe for 40 years.

"Anything to undermine NATO will be highly damaging to the defence of liberty," she said.

NATO's strategy could not be determined by any one country, and she claimed the overwhelming majority of NATO members backed the existing policy of defence through both nuclear and conventional weapons. Her comments come amid growing concern over a possible rift between NATO countries over the future of short-range nuclear weapons and whether America should agree to early talks with Moscow on reducing them.

The issue is certain to be in the spotlight when the prime minister visits Germany at the weekend for talks with Chancellor Kohl.

Mr Kinnock seized on the simmering row which threatens to mar NATO's 40th anniversary next month.

"When two-thirds of the people of West Germany are against modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons, isn't the German Government absolutely right to act on their view?" he demanded.

Mrs Thatcher said: "Short-range nuclear weapons are part of the NATO strategy. It is NATO strategy that is being discussed and NATO strategy cannot be determined by any one country."

The Labour leader pointed to the Warsaw Pact's estimated 16-1 advantage in short-range nuclear weapons, asking: "Doesn't it make sense for Britain and NATO to gain the most by negotiating their verifiable removal?"

Mrs Thatcher recalled an early day motion put down on the Commons order paper in February "congratulating the Socialist prime minister of France (Mr Rocard) on his statement that conventional and nuclear weapons are jointly necessary for the security of Europe." She quoted the motion as warning: "We must avoid disarmament becoming a smoke screen for denuclearisation," and she added "that was put down by a Socialist MP."

Mr Kinnock countered by quoting conservative Chancellor Kohl's view "that there should be early negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons based on the goal announced by the alliance...to achieve equal numbers at lower levels and negotiations on nuclear artillery."

But Mrs Thatcher retorted: "The strategy we are discussing is the strategy of NATO that has protected the peace for 40 years. It is a strategy which you do not accept and which you wish to throw away. The strategy in which you are engaged is to get the denuclearisation of Europe and to have no safety left in defence in NATO for this country."

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith said many parliamentarians here and in Europe shared Mrs Thatcher's deep concern about West Germany's proposal to start talks on short-range nuclear weapon reductions in advance of cuts in chemical weapons and conventional forces.

Mrs Thatcher said: "NATO has played a vital role in maintaining Germany's freedom, which started on the day the Second World War ended and I don't believe the German Government want to put NATO at risk."

Later, she told Patrick Thompson: "We are firmly behind NATO's strategy, which is a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons. So, I believe, is the United States and so, I believe, are the overwhelming majority of NATO (countries). Anything to undermine NATO will be highly damaging to the defence of liberty."

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